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PROMISES, POLICIES, AND PRINCIPLES:
THE SUPREME COURT AND CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION IN LABOR RELATIONS
Daniel P. O'Gorman*
When the United States Supreme Court decides which promises
made in the labor relations context should be enforced, and how to inter-
pret those promises, has the Court treated those promises differently
from the way the legal system has generally treated promises? Specifi-
cally, have policies (in particular, federal labor policy and its goals of
wealth redistribution and industrial peace) played a predominant role,
or have principles (in particular, notions of freedom of contract and the
autonomy and will of contracting parties) played a predominant role?
This Article maintains that the Court's treatment of labor relations
promises from the Wagner Act's passage in 1935 to the Warren Court
era's end in 1969 was consistent with Professor Grant Gilmore's famous
"death of contract" thesis regarding contract law, as well as the pre-
dominant legal thinking of the time, the "legal process school." Specifi-
cally during this time period, whether the Court enforced a particular
labor relations promise, and how those promises were interpreted was
determined by balancing competing policies, with federal labor policy
being the most important. But in the early 1970s the Court shifted to
treating principles (specifically, freedom of contract and the autonomy
and will of the parties) as the primary bases for enforcing labor relations
promises. This latter approach was correct because it is consistent with
congressional intent.
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INTRODUCTION
When the U.S. Supreme Court decides which promises made in the
labor relations context should be enforced, and how to interpret those
promises, has the Court treated those promises differently from the way
the legal system has generally treated promises? Specifically, have poli-
cies (in particular, federal labor policy and its goals of wealth redistribu-
tion and industrial peace) played a predominant role, or have principles
(in particular, notions of freedom of contract and the autonomy and will
of contracting parties) played a predominant role?
This Article maintains that the Court's treatment of labor relations
promises from the Wagner Act's passage in 19352 to the Warren Court
era's end in 1969 was consistent with Professor Grant Gilmore's famous
"death of contract" thesis regarding contract law,3 as well as the predom-
inant legal thinking of the time, the "legal process school."4 Specifically,
during this time period, whether the Court enforced a particular labor
relations promise, and how that promise was interpreted, was determined
by balancing competing policies, with federal labor policy being the
I Throughout this Article, I use the terms "policy" and "principle" in the sense used by
Professor Ronald Dworkin. "Arguments of policy justify a political decision by showing that
the decision advances or protects some collective goal of the community as a whole ....
Arguments of principle justify a political decision by showing that the decision respects or
secures some individual or group right." Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. RE-v.
1057, 1059 (1975).
2 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006)).
3 See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH or CONTRACT I (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 2d ed.
1995) (arguing that contract law was "dead").
4 See David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III, Introduction to THE CANON OF AMERI-
CAN LEGAL THOUGHT II (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III, eds., 2006) (discussing the
"legal process" school).
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most important. And if Stewart Macaulay was the "Lord High Execu-
tioner of the Contract is Dead school,"5 the Warren Court was the Lord
High Executioner of the "collective bargaining agreements are dead"
school, with the high-water mark reached in 1964 in John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. v. Livingston.6
But in the early 1970s-starting in 1972 with NLRB v. Burns Inter-
national Security Services, Inc.,7 soon after the "legal process" consensus
was shattered8 and Gilmore asked whether contract law would be resur-
rected 9-the Court shifted to treating principles (specifically, freedom of
contract and the autonomy and will of the parties) as the primary bases
for enforcing labor relations promises. This shift coincided with the rise
of freedom of contract arguments by legal scholars arguing from both
principles-based positions-scholars such as Charles Fried10 and Randy
Barnett' '-and policy-based positions-scholars such as Richard Pos-
ner.12 The shift also coincided with the revival of libertarianism in polit-
ical philosophy, spearheaded by Robert Nozick's 1974 publication of
Anarchy, State and Utopia.13
Part I of this Article explores legal thinking about contract law from
the late nineteenth century to the present. Part II discusses those situa-
tions in which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over labor relations
promises. Part III discusses how the Court has treated promises made in
the context of labor relations since the mid-1930s. Part IV addresses
whether the Court's treatment of labor relations promises from the mid-
1930s to the late 1960s is more consistent with congressional intent than
the Court's treatment of labor relations promises from the 1970s to the
present. Finally, this Article concludes that the latter approach is more
consistent with congressional intent.
5 GILMOREo, supra note 3, at 113 n.I.
6 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
7 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
8 Kennedy & Fisher Ill, supra note 4, at I1. The legal process consensus was shattered
in the few years around 1968. Id.
9 See GIHMORE, supra note 3, at 112 ("Contract is dead-but who knows what unlikely
resurrection the Easter-tide may bring?").
10 See CHARL Es FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CON-TRACTUAL OBtLIGA-
TION 14 (1981) (arguing that the underlying basis for contract law is the moral obligation to
keep a promise).
II See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 CoLum. L. Ruy. 269, 269-71
(1986) (arguing that the underlying basis for contract law is the consent of the parties to be
legally bound).
12 See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT
LAW 1-9 (1979); RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 1-8 (1972).
13 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
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I. JUDICIAL REASONING ABOUT CONTRACT LAW
A. Various Substantive Principles and Policies a Court Might Pursue
in Deciding Whether to Enforce a Promise and How
to Interpret it
Before addressing judicial reasoning about contract law, it is useful
to identify the various principles and policies a court might consider
when deciding which promises to enforce, and how to interpret those
promises it does enforce.
A court might consider five principles. The first principle is pro-
tecting the promisee's "reliance interest," which is the promisee's inter-
est in not being placed in a worse position than before the promise was
made because of the promisor's promise and its non-performance.14
This interest includes the expenses the promisee incurred in anticipation
of performance and would have recouped had there been performance;
harm caused by faulty performance (such as personal injury or property
damage); expenses the promisee incurred in attempting to mitigate dam-
ages after the breach that would not have been incurred had there been
performance; and any psychological harm caused by disappointed expec-
tations.15 The reliance interest is particularly strong because the prom-
isor has caused harm to the promisee, and causing harm to another is a
generally recognized basis for requiring compensation under the concept
of corrective justice.16 The more tangible the harm, the greater the inter-
est in protecting it (for example, psychological harm has traditionally
received little protection from the legal system).' 7 The doctrine of prom-
14 See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 CoiJm L. Riy. 799, 810 (1941) ("A
second substantive basis of contract liability lies in a recognition that the breach of a promise
may work an injury to one who has changed his position in reliance on the expectation that the
promise will be fulfilled.").
15 1 have included within the reliance interest category, as a substantive basis for enforc-
ing a promise, any harm (tangible or intangible) caused by the promisor not keeping her prom-
ise, including the psychological harm from disappointed expectations. This category does not,
however, consider "harm" to be a simple failure to receive what was promised. With respect
to psychological harm from a breach, Professor Fuller stated as follows:
The breach of a promise arouses in the promisee a sense of injury. This feeling is
not confined to cases where the promisee has [tangibly] relied on the promise.
Whether or not he has actually changed his position because of the promise, the
promisee has formed an attitude of expectancy such that a breach of a promise
causes him to feel that he has been 'deprived' of something that was 'his.'
L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE
L.J 52, 57 (1936). 1 have included psychological harm in the reliance interest category be-
cause the harm is caused by reliance. The promisee's reliance is in the form of expecting the
promisor to keep her promise. Thus, the promisee has changed her position as a result of the
promise, even if it is only a psychological change of position.
16 See Steven Walt, Eliminating Corrective Justice, 92 VA. L. Riy. 1311, 1317 (2006)
("Corrective justice[ ]... requires compensation for a wrongful harm that has occurred.").
17 See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CoRNELL L. Rtv. 291, 324 (1983) ("Traditionally, courts were
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issory estoppel is based on protecting the reliance interest.'5 The diffi-
culty with the reliance interest is that the legal system often permits
persons to inflict harm on others without paying compensation when the
actor's conduct is considered justified.19 Thus, the mere fact that a per-
son's act or omission caused harm to another does not mean the person
who caused the harm should be required to compensate the victim.
The second principle courts might consider is protecting the prom-
isee's "restitution interest," which is the promisee's interest in receiving
compensation for benefits provided to someone else.20 The restitution
interest is stronger than the reliance interest because it combines a loss
by the promisee with a benefit received by the promisor.21 The doctrine
of promissory restitution is based in part on protecting the restitution
interest. 22 Yet, the difficulty with this interest is that the legal system
does not require compensation for all benefits received. The legal sys-
tem only requires compensation when it is "unjust" to not pay for the
benefit, 23 which results in the difficult determination of when non-pay-
ment results in injustice.
The third principle is protecting the promisor's "autonomy interest,"
which is the promisor's interest in making her own choices. 24 Because
our society values freedom, this principle is strong. 25 This principle
would arguably support the enforcement of all promises, not simply
extremely reluctant to compensate plaintiffs for emotional harms except as an adjunct to
awards of damages for other injuries that the courts deemed more concrete and easier to
value.").
18 See Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 HAS-
TINGs L.J. 1191, 1196-98 (1998).
19 See, e.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing) ("[I]n numberless instances the law warrants the intentional infliction of temporal dam-
age, because it regards it as justified."); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. Riv. 457, 466 (1897) ("Why is a man at liberty to set up a business which he knows
will ruin his neighbor? It is because the public good is supposed to be best subserved by free
competition.").
20 See Fuller, supra note 14, at 812.
21 Id.
22 See generally Stanley Henderson, Promises Grounded in the Past: The Idea of Unjust
Enrichment and the Law of Contracts, 57 VA. L. Riw. 1115, 1116-19 (1971) (explaining how
rules governing promises for benefit received are anchored in restitution).
23 See RESTATEMENTi OiF RusTIrurTION § I (1937) ("A person who has been unjustly en-
riched at the expense of another is required to make compensation to the other." (emphasis
added)).
24 See FRIED, supra note 10, at 13 ("In order that I be as free as possible, that my will
have the greatest possible range consistent with the similar will of others, it is necessary that
there be a way in which I may commit myself."); Fuller, supra note 14, at 806 ("Among the
basic conceptions of contract law the most pervasive and indispensible is the principle of
private autonomy. This principle simply means that the law views private individuals as pos-
sessing a power to effect, within certain limits, changes in their legal relations.").
25 See Alan L. Calnan, Distributive and Corrective Justice Issues in Contemporary To-
bacco Litigation, 27 Sw. U. L. Riv. 577, 605 (1998) (noting that a core value of our society is
"freedom or autonomy.").
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those given for consideration or that cause reliance. 26 A difficulty with
this principle is that persons do not always make good choices. Also,
persons might choose to break their promises, which arguably should be
protected under the autonomy principle as well. 2 7
The fourth principle is the moral obligation to keep a promise.28
This principle focuses on sanctioning the promisor for engaging in
wrongdoing (breaking a promise), whereas the autonomy principle fo-
cuses on respecting the promisor's choices. The enforceability of any
promise might be based, at least in part, on this principle, and courts
implicitly invoke this principle by requiring a lesser degree of certainty
for the recovery of damages when a breach is willful. 2 9
The fifth principle is the "relief-of-hardship" principle, which "calls
for courts to let one party out of his bargain in exceptional cases where
enforcement would be unduly harsh, or, where the content of the bargain
is in doubt, to place the burden on the party best able to spread the loss or
absorb it."30 The doctrines of unconscionability and impracticability are
based on this principle.31
Additionally, there are three policies that a court might consider
when deciding whether to enforce a particular promise, and how to inter-
pret it. The first is avoiding the private vengeance that might result if a
26 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961, 1127 (2001) ("[T]he fostering of autonomy implies enforcement of all promises . . .
27 Professor Fried attempts to explain away the paradox as follows:
The only mystery about this is the mystery that surrounds increasing autonomy by
providing means for restricting it. But really this is a pseudomystery. The restric-
tions involved in promising are restrictions undertaken just in order to increase one's
options in the long run, and thus are perfectly consistent with the principle of auton-
omy-consistent with respect for one's own autonomy and the autonomy of others.
FRIED, supra note 10, at 14.
28 See P.S. AriYAH, AN IN'rRoDUCTION To THE LAW OF CONTRAcT 2-3 (4th ed. 1989)
("[B]ehind a great deal of the law of contract there lies the moral principle that a person should
fulfil his promises and abide by his agreements . . . . [Alt least one strong undercurrent in
contract law does derive from the idea that a person ought to keep his word, and that promises
impose moral obligations."); FRIED, supra note 10, at 8 ("By promising we transform a choice
that was morally neutral into one that is morally compelled.").
29 See Laurin v. DeCarolis Constr. Co., 363 N.E.2d 675, 678 (Mass. 1977) (relying on
the "deliberate and willful" nature of the breach in determining damages); Groves v. John
Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235, 236 (Minn. 1939) (same); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CON
TRACTS § 352 cmt. a (1981) ("A court may take into account all the circumstances of the
breach, including willfulness, in deciding whether to require a lesser degree of certainty, giv-
ing greater discretion to the trier of the facts.").
30 Stewart Macaulay, Justice Traynor and the Law of Contracts, 13 STAN. L. REv. 812,
815 (1961).
31 Kevin M. Teeven, Decline of Freedom of Contract Since the Emergence of the Mod-
em Business Corporation, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 117, 136 (1992).
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promisee cannot obtain redress from a court.32 Although this policy is
strong, criminal law is already a deterrent to private vengeance.33
The second policy is promoting exchange. 3 4 Facilitating the ex-
change of goods and services is valuable because an exchange presuma-
bly makes both parties better off, thereby increasing societal wealth.3 5
Contract law promotes exchange because "[o]ne or both parties will have
to perform in the future, which means that the other party has to trust
him so to perform, [and] has to have confidence that he will perform." 36
By imposing a sanction for breaching a contract, "[c]o-operation then
becomes much easier, and exchanges are facilitated." 37 Of course, per-
sons might have different views on which contract doctrines help pro-
mote exchange. For example, some might favor contract rules severely
limiting government interference, and others might favor rules providing
the government with a substantial regulatory role.
The third policy is distributive justice, which advocates moving
wealth from society's wealthier members to its poorer members. 38
Courts that enforce promises to charities in the absence of apparent con-
sideration or reliance presumably rely on this principle.39 The difficulty
with this policy is that contract law is not particularly well suited for
32 See JosEPH M. PtRILLO, CALAMARI AND PEnIn o ON CONTRACrs 5-6 (6th ed. 2009)
("It is well-recognized that the law of crimes and torts owe their origin to the state's desire to
eliminate private vengeance and to minimize other forms of self-help. It is not as well known
that contract law has the same genesis .. . . Anthropology and history prove that a basis of
contract law is the desire to keep the public peace.").
33 See James Boyd White, Legal Knowledge, 115 HARV. L. Re-v. 1396, 1403 n.10 (2002)
(noting that one of the purposes of criminal law is deterrence).
34 See ATIYAH, supra note 28, at 3 ("Contract law is ... in large part, the law of ex-
change, the law which regulates the methods by which individuals exchange goods and ser-
vices usually in return for money."); Macaulay, supra note 30, at 813 ("Clearly, contract is a
legal device primarily designed to support the market institution . . . .").
35 See KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 12, at 2 (recognizing that exchange increases
societal wealth).
36 ATIYAH, supra note 28, at 6 (emphasis in original).
3 Id. at 7.
38 See Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472,
472-73 (1980) ("[l]t has sometimes been suggested that the law of contracts should also be
used as an instrument of distributive justice and that those responsible for choosing or design-
ing rules of contract law-courts and legislatures-should do so with an eye to their distribu-
tional effects in a self-conscious effort to achieve a fair division of wealth among the members
of society.").
39 See, e.g., I & I Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg, 12 N.E.2d 532, 534 (N.Y. 1938) (finding
consideration and enforcing promise based on an implied condition that the charity continue
with its work); Allegheny Coll. v. Nat'l Chautauqua Cnty. Bank, 159 N.E. 173, 176 (N.Y.
1927) (holding that promise of funds to college was supported by consideration because prom-
isor stated that the gift was to be named after her); RESTATEMENT (SEcoNo) OF CONTRACIS
§ 90(2) (1981) (promise to charity enforceable under promissory estoppel even without reli-
ance); Id. cmt. f ("American courts have traditionally favored charitable subscriptions . . . and
have found consideration in many cases where the element of exchange was doubtful or
nonexistent.").
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wealth redistribution; the government's use of its taxing power is likely
more effective. 40
In deciding which promises to enforce, and how to interpret them, a
court is required to assign weight to these various principles and policies
based on their perceived importance, and also consider whether they are
matters appropriate for a court (as opposed to a legislature) to consider.
As discussed in the next section, the weight given to these various princi-
ples and policies has varied in different eras. After assigning weight to
these principles and polices, the court must decide whether any benefits
from enforcement are outweighed by the enforcement costs to society (in
the form of judicial resources).
A court must also decide the form that contract rules will take. As
Professor Duncan Kennedy notes:
There are . .. two opposed modes for dealing with ques-
tions of the form in which legal solutions to the substan-
tive problems should be cast. One formal mode favors
the use of clearly defined, highly administrable, general
rules; the other supports the use of equitable standards
producing ad hoc decisions with relatively little prece-
dential value. 41
Jurists who value individualism (autonomy) over altruism (wealth
redistribution) tend to favor rules, whereas jurists who value altruism
over individualism tend to favor standards. 42 But as Judge Richard Pos-
ner stated, "No sensible person supposes that rules are always superior to
standards, or vice versa, though some judges are drawn to the definite-
ness of rules and others to the flexibility of standards." 43 Examples of
rules include requirements of form, such as requiring that a contract cov-
ering a particular matter be evidenced by a signed writing to be enforcea-
40 On this point, one scholar has argued:
Contract law's failure to embrace redistribution as a core goal can be justified on the
grounds that contract cannot do this job well. Contract law rules are often a crude,
temporary, and puny means of redistribution. For example, a contract rule that redis-
tributes wealth from landlords to tenants is crude because it does not help the home-
less or affect wealthy non-landlords, while it does affect relatively poor as well as
rich landlords. Furthermore, this sort of rule is temporary in that increased costs of a
rule frequently can be passed along (to the tenants), or investments can be shifted to
avoid the costs of the rule. Finally, given the extremes of wealth and poverty in our
society, contract rules are a small, slow way to achieve redistribution. Taxes and
transfer payments are a better way to maintain a pattern of distributive justice.
See Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law,
47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 697, 714 (1990).
41 Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1685 (1976).
42 Id.
43 MindGames, Inc. v. W. Publ'g Co., 218 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2000).
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ble.44 The requirements of form provide evidence of the transaction,
which reduces the cost of enforcement; act "as a check against inconsid-
erate action," which promotes the principles of autonomy and relief from
hardship; and provide a method for parties to give intended legal effect to
their transactions, which promotes autonomy and exchange.4 5
B. Theories of Contract Law Through the Ages
In 1974, Grant Gilmore, a professor at Yale Law School, famously
argued that contract law had died. 4 6 He asserted that although contract
law had been "alive and well in the nineteenth century," it had been
"dying a lingering death" since around the 1920s.4 7 He argued that by
the time Arthur Corbin's famous contracts treatise was published in
1950, "the process of decay and disintegration was already apparent." 4 8
The "contract law" that Gilmore maintained had died has been
called "classical contract law." 4 9 Classical contract law's origins date to
the late eighteenth century, when the industrial revolution created a need
for rules of commercial law. 50 According to Gilmore, Oliver Wendell
Holmes provided the theory's broad philosophical outline in the late
nineteenth century in his book The Common Law, and Samuel Williston
provided the scholarly detail in his 1920 contracts treatise.51 Thus, it was
the "Holmes-Williston construct" of classical contract law to which Gil-
more referred. 5 2 Scholars have identified the publication of the Restate-
ment (First) of Contracts in 1932 as classical contract law's high-water
mark.5 3
Classical contract law had several characteristics. First, it was a
general theory of contract law that applied to all contracts irrespective of
subject matter, as opposed to having separate doctrines applicable to dif-
ferent types of contracts such as sales contracts, employment contracts,
and insurance contracts.54 According to Gilmore, Christopher Columbus
44 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201 (1977).
45 Fuller, supra note 14, at 800-01.
46 See Gr.MORE, supra note 3, at I ("WE ARE TOLD that Contract, like God, is dead.
And so it is. Indeed the point is hardly worth arguing anymore.").
47 Id. at 2.
48 Id. at 6.
49 See Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARv. L. Ray.
678, 681 (1984).
50 See GILMORE, supra note 3, at 10; W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISIEs: THE LATE
20TH-CENTURY REiFORMATION OF CONTRACI LAW 9 (1996).
51 GiL-mo~un, supra note 3, at 15.
52 See id.
53 Knapp, supra note 18, at 1193-94.
54 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACr LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND EcO-
NOMIC CASE STUDY 20-24 (1965).
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Langdell, the Dean of the Harvard Law School from 1870 to 1895,55
with the publication of his contracts casebook in 187156 and his Sum-
mary of the Law of Contracts in 1880,57 originated the idea that a general
theory of contract law should exist.58 Holmes, with the publication of
The Common Law in 1881, also tried to make sense of contract law as a
whole.59 In 1920, Samuel Williston complained in the introduction to
his famous treatise that the law of contracts "tends from its very size to
fall apart," and asserted that "[ilt therefore seems desirable to treat the
subject of contracts as a whole, and to show the wide range of applica-
tion of its principles." 60
Consistent with the desire for a general theory of contract, the
American Law Institute (ALI) published the Restatement (First) of Con-
tracts in 1932, with Williston as its Reporter.61 The ALI's motive for
restating the rules of contract law (and the rules of other areas of the
common law) was to "clarify and simplify the law and to render it more
certain .... *"62 The ALI maintained that "the vast and ever increasing
volume of the decisions of the courts establishing new rules or prece-
dents, and the numerous instances in which the decisions are irreconcila-
ble has resulted in ever increasing uncertainty in the law." 6 3 Thus,
classical contract law placed a high premium on certainty, even at the
expense of occasional injustice. 64
Classical contract law's second characteristic concerned the mode
"for dealing with questions of the form in which legal solutions to the
substantive problems [of contract law] should be cast," 65 with classical
contract law preferring rules to standards. 66 This preference for rules
was consistent with a desire for certainty and a desire to restrain official
arbitrariness (which helped separate law and politics, or at least helped
55 ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD: A HisTORY OF IDEAS AND) MEN,
1817-1967, at 162 (1967).
56 C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTIN oN CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACrs (1871).
57 C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1880).
58 GILMORE, supra note 3, at 13.
59 See OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881).
60 SAMUEL WIuLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS iii (1920).
6 t See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, intro. ix (1932) (identifying Williston as
the Reporter).
62 See id. at intro. viii.
63 Id.
64 See LANGDELL, supra note 57, at 20-21 (asserting that the "mailbox rule" should be
rejected even if its rejection would result in injustice because the rule does not logically follow
from contract law's governing principles).
65 Kennedy, supra note 41, at 1685.
66 See Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract
Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 767 (2002).
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create the appearance of separation). 67 This preference for rules over
standards was exhibited in giving primacy to written documents over oral
terms (as evidenced by the plain meaning doctrine and the parol evidence
rule).68
Classical contract law's third characteristic was to derive its rules
through deduction from abstract, axiomatic principles, an approach (deri-
sively) called "formalism" or "conceptualism." 6 9 Fourth and finally,
these axiomatic principles were to be premised on the idea of freedom of
contract, the idea that individuals should have the power to enter into
contracts and have them enforced without government interference (other
than enforcing them, of course). 70
But what were the principles or policies that generated the idea of
"freedom of contract"? Here, classical contract law revealed its suscepti-
bility to decay. Classical contract law and its goal of freedom of contract
were premised on both a principle and a policy that were to some extent
inconsistent.
One basis for classical contract law and its goal of freedom of con-
tract was liberalism, the political philosophy that emphasized an individ-
ual's right to freedom from state coercion.7' For example, to the "judges
of the eighteenth century theories of natural law meant that men had an
inalienable right to own property, and therefore to make their own ar-
rangements to buy or sell or otherwise deal with that property, and hence
to make their own contracts for themselves." 72 Liberalism, as applied to
contract law, found expression in the "will theory of contract."73 Under
this theory, which Langdell advocated,74 courts simply implemented the
desires of the contracting parties.75 Yet, will theory is not simply the
right to freedom from state coercion; it includes the right to have the
state enforce one's contract rights, which are rights against other
individuals.76
Under this approach, the parties' will was the most important basis
for a court's decision in a particular case.77 As such, judicial reasoning
67 See Kennedy, supra note 41, at 1688 ("It has been common ground, at least since
Ihering, that the two great social virtues of formally realizable rules, as opposed to standards or
principles, are the restraint of official arbitrariness and certainty.").
68 See Knapp, supra note 66, at 767.
69 See id.
70 See id.
71 SLAWSON, supra note 50, at 10-11.
72 AIYAH, supra note 28, at 8 (referring to English judges).
73 See Morris Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. Riv. 553, 575 (1933) (discuss-
ing the will theory of contract).
74 See id. (identifying Langdell as a will theorist).
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would (presumably) remain apolitical, and the approach resembled a
Kantian approach premised on moral responsibility for one's actions.78
Such an idea was consistent with the prevailing nineteenth century notion
that judges, even with respect to the common law, did not make law but
rather "found" it.79 The idea of freedom of contract as a natural right
was also part of the movement away from government paternalism and
toward individualism.80 As Professor Atiyah noted with respect to
England:
[T]his rejection of paternalism was actually part of a re-
form movement which was closely allied to the political
movement towards democracy. It was the reformers of
the 1830s who proclaimed their faith in individualism,
their belief that the mass of the people could be trusted
to look after their own interests . .. .81
Thus, classical contract law was based largely on the principle of
autonomy.
But classical contract law and its goal of freedom of contract were
also based on a policy, that of protecting and promoting the free mar-
ket.8 2 This policy emphasized the benefits of competition and granting
persons the freedom to set prices and other terms of their bargains.83 In
contrast to the pre-political principle of liberalism, this was a utilitarian
policy designed to increase societal welfare.8 4 Holmes, whose 1881 pub-
lication of The Common Law demonstrated a desire for unifying theories
of law, approached contract law from a policy-based vantage point.85
For example, by 1897, with the publication of his article The Path of the
Law, Holmes argued that contract doctrines were based on policy
choices, and he "openly accepted .. . utilitarianism as the goal of law." 86
Thus, Holmes, who did much to establish the objective theory of con-
tracts and the requirement of a bargain as primary doctrines of classical
78 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 26, at I 104 n.322 (equating the "will theory" with
Kantianism).
79 SLAWSON, supra note 50, at 10.
80 AIYAH, supra note 28, at 8-10.
81 IId. at 10.
82 See SLAWSON, supra note 50, at 10.
83 Id.
84 See Dworkin, supra note 1, at 1068 ("Economic efficiency is a collective goal: it calls
for such distribution of opportunities and liabilities as will produce the greatest aggregate
economic benefit defined in some way.").
85 See HoLMuS, supra note 59.
86 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction
to the Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, TEi- LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING ANI) APPLICATION OP LAW Ivii (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
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contract law, did so for policy reasons, not reasons of principle.87 There-
fore, classical contract law was also based on the policy of promoting
exchange.
Accordingly, the phrase "freedom of contract" (the governing idea
of classical contract law) might describe an abstract pre-political individ-
ual right or, in contrast, a utilitarian goal to increase societal welfare.88
Presumably, for those who supported the goal of freedom of contract, a
theory based on individual rights as opposed to collective goals seemed
more impervious to the criticism that judges were making law. Judges
were simply enforcing pre-political individual rights, not making policy
choices that were better left to the legislature. Also, an individual right
was likely less impervious to qualification and competing interests than a
mere policy.
Classical contract law's leading doctrines, presumably deduced
from these "large, abstract, and integrated theories"89 such as autonomy
and efficiency, were as follows: (1) the parties' power to choose the con-
tents of their contracts;90 (2) contract liability based on voluntarily as-
sumed duties, not state imposed duties (thus, there should be a clear
distinction between contract law and tort law); 91 (3) objective determina-
tions of whether duties were voluntarily assumed and what those duties
were;92 (4) promises were only enforceable if part of a bargained-for-
exchange, which required mutual assent and consideration; 93 (5) limited
87 See id.
88 See Dworkin, supra note 1, at 1069 ("The same phrase might describe a right within
one theory and a goal within another . . . .").
89 MORTON J. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS on LEGAL ORTHoDoxY 49 (1992).
90 SLAWSON, supra note 50, at 3.
91 Id.; see also GILMORE, supra note 3, at 16-17 ("Contractual liability ... was to be
sharply differentiated from tort liability and there was to be no softening or blurring of the
harsh limitations of contract theory by the recognition of an intermediate no-man's-land be-
tween contract and tort . . . .").
92 GILMORE, supra note 3, at 16-17. Interestingly, this brought tort law's "reasonable
person" standard into contract law. See Ricketts v. Pa. R.R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir.
1946) (Frank, J., concurring) (stating that contract law, through the use of the objective theory
of contracts, "transferred from the field of torts that stubborn anti-subjectivist, the 'reasonable
man.' ").
93 GILMORE, supra note 3, at 19-20. Gilmore's argument that the "balance-wheel of the
great machine was the theory of consideration" and that Williston was one of the architects of
classical contract law, seems contradicted by Williston's Model Written Obligations Act,
which rendered a promise enforceable without consideration, as long as the promisor made a
written statement of an intention to be legally bound. See JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CON-
TRAC] s: CAsEs AND COMMENr 188 (9th ed. 2008) (discussing Model Written Obligations Act).
Also, the Restatement (First) of Contracts recognized sham consideration as rendering a prom-
ise enforceable, see RFSTAEIMENTr (FIRST) OF CONrRACIS § 84 illus. 1 (1932) (providing that
sham consideration in the amount of $1 is valid consideration to make an enforceable promise
of a gift worth $5,000), and Williston was the Reporter for the Restatement (First) of Con-
tracts. See id. at ix. Accordingly, it appears Williston did not believe an actual bargained-for
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excuses for non-performance of a contractual duty;94 and (6) limited
damages. 95
Although the fourth and fifth doctrines appear paradoxical (enforce
few promises but provide few excuses for non-performance), Professor
Duncan Kennedy noted that they both flow from a desire to promote
individualism as opposed to altruism:
The individualist position is the restriction of obligations
of sharing and sacrifice. This means being opposed to
the broadening, intensifying and extension of liability
and opposed to the liberalization of excuses once duty is
established. This position is only superficially paradoxi-
cal. The contraction of initial liability leaves greater ar-
eas for people to behave in a self-interested fashion.
Liberal rules of excuse have the opposite effect: they
oblige the beneficiary of a duty to share the losses of the
obligor when for some reason he is unable to perform.
The altruist position is the expansion of the network of
liability and also the liberalization of excuses. 96
These six doctrines, however, disclosed classical contract law's
fault lines. If classical contract law was premised on doctrines deduced
from general principles, and some of the established doctrines did not
flow from those general principles, the entire project would be subject to
criticism. The consideration requirement and the objective theory of
contracts exposed the project's weakness. For example, Gilmore argued
that Holmes wanted liability reduced to avoid discouraging socially use-
ful activities;97 this was consistent with his emphasis on policies (and
utilitarianism), not principles. To reduce liability, the stricter require-
ment of consideration, which required a bargained-for exchange, re-
placed the "benefit-detriment" test for rendering a promise enforceable. 98
However, if contract law was primarily premised on implementing the
exchange should be necessary to render a promise enforceable. See id. § 84 illus. 1. Rather,
he appears to have simply desired some formality to show that the promisor intended the
promise to be legally binding and had perhaps given the matter sufficient thought. See id.
94 Gu.MoRn, supra note 3, at 49-53.
95 Id. at 16, 58.
96 Kennedy, supra note 41, at 1735 (emphasis in original).
97 See GILMORE, supra note 3, at 18.
98 See id. at 19-20 ("The balance-wheel of the great machine was the theory of consider-
ation . . . ."); see also HOLMES, supra note 59, at 293-94 ("[I]t is the essence of a considera-
tion, that, by the terms of the agreement, it is given and accepted as the motive or inducement
of the promise. Conversely, the promise must be made and accepted as the conventional mo-
tive or inducement for furnishing the consideration. The root of the whole matter is the rela-
tion of reciprocal conventional inducement, each for the other, between consideration and
promise.").
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parties' will (the principle of autonomy), this would render consideration
unnecessary to enforce a promise. 99
Also, the objective theory of contracts, while perhaps consistent
with the will theory if one considers an objective manifestation as the
best evidence of subjective intent,i00 fits more comfortably within a utili-
tarian approach than the will theory.o'0 For example, Mark DeWolfe
Howe argues that what drove Holmes's emphasis on objective tests was
a desire to avoid the damaging effects Kantian ethics (which were pre-
mised on autonomy and not utilitarianism) could have if imported into
American law.' 02 Thus, classical contract law's consideration require-
ment and objective approach suggest that utilitarianism was its primary
basis, and that the will theory was advanced to make it appear judges
were not engaged in lawmaking and policy choices.
Other classical contract law doctrines fit more comfortably into both
a utilitarian approach and the will theory. For example, the doctrine that
adequacy of consideration should not be assessed could be premised not
only on the utilitarian notion that parties are best able to judge what is a
good deal for them, 03 but also on the will theory because the parties
voluntarily agreed to the bad deal.'o4 The doctrine that excuses for non-
performance apply narrowly could be justified by the utilitarian view that
too many excuses would threaten contractual stability, 05 as well as by
the will theory in that a party who promised to perform should be held to
that promise unless the promisor conditioned performance on the non-
occurrence of the particular event.' 0 6 The doctrine of limited damages
99 See Kennedy & Fisher III, supra note 4, at 212; see also FRIED, supra note 10, at 35
(arguing against the consideration doctrine).
100 See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 14, at 808 (arguing that the principle of autonomy and the
objective theory of contracts were not inconsistent).
101 See Nicholas C. Dranias, Consideration as Contract: A Secular Natural Law of Con-
tracts, 12 Te~x. Rev. L. & Poi.. 267, 296-97 (2008) (noting the utilitarian bases for the objec-
tive theory of contracts).
102 Mark DeWolfe Howe, Introduction to OUVER WENDELu HoLmus, JR., THE COMMON
LAW XI, XV-XVi (Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed., Little Brown & Co. 1963).
103 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. c (1981) ("Valuation is left to
private action in part because the parties are thought to be better able than others to evaluate
the circumstances of particular transactions.").
104 See Deborah A. Ballam, The Evolution of the Government-Business Relationship in
the United States: Colonial Times to Present, 31 AM. Bus. L.J. 553, 587 (1994) ("Under the
will theory, judges no longer looked at the fairness of the contract terms; rather, they focused
on whether the minds of the parties had met. If they found a meeting of the minds, the con-
tract would be enforced as written, regardless of the fairness of the terms. Adequacy of con-
sideration was no longer used as a means of invalidating contracts.").
105 See Subha Narasimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracting, and the Bargain
Principle, 74 CALWI. L. Riv. 1123, 1172 (1986) ("[E]xcuse and modification doctrines are
expanding because of a perceived need to respond to the reality of incomplete contracting. But
these expanding doctrines threaten contractual stability . . . .").
106 See Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897, 897 (K.B. 1647) ("[W]hen the party by his
own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may,
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could be justified on utilitarian grounds in that it would encourage parties
to enter into contracts, 0 7 and the will theory in that the breaching party
had not consented to greater liability. 08
In any event, in the late nineteenth century the fault lines underneath
classical contract law's surface were a concern for another day. The
principle of autonomy and the policy of promoting exchange each sup-
ported contract doctrines that promoted individualism and freedom of
contract. In fact, during this era the devotion to freedom of contract was
so strong that the freedom to bind oneself to a contract was construed as
a constitutional right.'09
Not surprisingly, the effect of classical contract law's indifference
to a contract's subject matter and its emphasis on bargained-for ex-
changes and rules over standards, was the protection of the free market
against incursions in the name of social policy. Although scholars dis-
pute whether the supposed builders of this general theory of contract
(Langdell, Holmes, and Williston) really had a "theory,""10 or were sim-
ply describing what they saw, classical contract law was perceived as
protecting the strong at the expense of the weak and eschewing justice.
Critics of classical contract law also "foreground[ed] a link between the
(gap-ridden) legal formalist methods of thinking and (politically retro-
grade) laissez-faire individualism and voluntarism."'
Classical contract law's emphasis on rules, such as the consideration
requirement, appeared to even wreak havoc on the encouragement of
bargains. According to Gilmore, Williston used the consideration doc-
trine to deny enforcement to all sorts of promises, such as promises to
keep an offer open, to modify a contract, and to discharge a debt.' 12 If
the consideration doctrine was designed to render bargains enforceable,
why should courts not enforce a promise to keep open an offer of a bar-
gain? Would not the enforcement of such a promise, even without con-
notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against
it by his contract.").
107 See Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and
Tortious Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. Ruv. 1085, 1096 (2000) (noting that limitations on
damages encourage contract-making). Holmes's most celebrated example of keeping damages
low is his Swift v. Tyson era gloss on the Hadley rule. See Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil
Co., 190 U.S. 540, 544-46 (1903).
108 See Globe, 190 U.S. at 543 (arguing that damages should be based on the tacit consent
of the breaching party to be liable for such loss at the time the contract was entered into).
109 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). While the Court has not expressly
overruled Lochner, West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish is often cited for the proposition that
Lochner is no longer good law. See 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
1 10 See Peter Benson, Introduction to THE THEORY OF CONTRACr LAW: NEw EsSAYs 2
n.4 (2001) (arguing that Langdell, Holmes, and Williston did not have a general theory of
contract).
I11 Kennedy & Fisher III, supra note 4, at 210.
112 GILMORE, supra note 3, at 23-36.
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sideration, promote exchanges? Classical contract law's obsession with
rules seemed to harm its own interests at times, making the whole project
look silly.
Furthermore, requiring new consideration for agreements to modify
a contract (meaning consideration different from "re-promising" to per-
form one's existing contract duty), seemed contrary to freedom of con-
tract and promoting exchanges. As Professor John Dawson observed:
Any performance that was already due under an existing
obligation was erased-deleted-as a permissible sub-
ject of new agreement, unless it was modified in some
minor way. Otherwise, in any dealings with the person
to whom the performance was due it could not form part
of an agreed exchange, no matter how convincing the
evidence might be that the exchange was desired-bar-
gained for-by both. Thus, within the limits of the obli-
gation their agreement had created, the parties had
destroyed their own power to contract.' 13
According to Gilmore, signs of decay in classical contract law were
already apparent when the ALI published the Restatement (First) of Con-
tracts in 1932. Gilmore believed the Restatement projects were in fact
life support efforts.' 14 He argued that the Restatement (First) of Con-
tracts was itself schizophrenic, "poised between past and future.", 1 5 The
decline of classical contract law was not surprising because its building
blocks were not particularly strong. As previously discussed, many of its
supporters argued it was premised on promoting the will of the parties,' 16
but the legal realists pointed out that the objective theory of contracts and
courts filling in gaps in contracts with implied terms were inconsistent
with the will theory.' 17 Legal realists also attacked the idea that judges
could or were deciding cases through deductive reasoning from a few
113 JOHN P. DAWSON, Gw-rs AND PRoMsIEs: CONTINENTAL AN) AMERICAN LAW COM-
PAREDo 210 (1980).
1 14 GILMORE, supra note 3, at 74. Gilmore was not the first to make this argument. Felix
Cohen made this argument as early as 1935 in his classic article attacking legal formalism, an
article sparing not even Cardozo from withering (and thoroughly entertaining) criticism (much
in the style of Gilmore). See Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Ap-
proach, 35 Coi-um. L. Ri-V. 809, 833 (1935) ("The age of the classical jurists is over, I think.
The 'Restatements of the Law' by the American Law Institute is the last long-drawn-out gasp
of a dying tradition."). Gilmore also argues that Holmes's theory of contract law "was in its
origins, and continued to be during its life, an ivory tower abstraction. Its natural habitat was
the law schools, not the courts." GIHMORE, supra note 3, at 19.
115 Gil-MORF, supra note 3, at 66, 72.
116 See Cohen, supra note 73.
1 17 See id. at 575-77.
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general principles.' 18 Legal realists pointed out that courts retained sig-
nificant discretion in applying legal doctrine, such that courts were in
part engaging in policy making when deciding cases. 19 For example,
Wesley Hohfeld famously pointed out as early as 1913 the errors often
made in formalist deductive reasoning. 120
Arthur L. Corbin led the attack on classical contract law in the early
twentieth century with a series of law review articlesl21 and perhaps also
in his role as Special Adviser on the ALI Committee on Contracts.122
Gilmore argued that Corbin's role as Special Adviser resulted in the Re-
statement (First) of Contract's schizophrenic quality, vacillating between
bargained-for exchange and reliance as the basis for the enforcement of
promises.123 In 1936, Lon Fuller (though not a legal realist) questioned
the basis for awarding expectation damages, arguing that it could not be
explained by the will theory of contracts.124 At the same time, opposi-
tion to the free market ideology undermined the economic underpinnings
of classical contract law, with Robert Hale pointing out that a govern-
ment's failure to regulate was as much a policy choice as regulation.125
Revealing classical contract law's faulty foundations opened the op-
portunity to demolish what was perceived as an unjust structure and to
build a better one. But while the legal realists' argument that judges
make policy choices ultimately became mainstream legal thought,126 the
legal realists failed to devise a generally-accepted answer to the question
of how courts should resolve such choices. 127 Thus, while the legal real-
ists successfully undermined the "principled" basis for classical contract
law (the will theory) and the "policy" basis (no government regulation of
the economy), they did not agree on a solution to replace classical con-
tract law.
S18 Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in A COMPANION 0 PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AN)
LEGAL THEORY 249, 262-63 (Dennis Patterson, 2d ed. 2010).
119 See BRAN H. Bix, A DiCflONARY OFl LEGAL. THEORY 3-4 (2004).
120 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judi-
cial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
121 See HoRwrrz, supra note 89, at 49 (identifying Corbin as the central legal figure in
contract law challenging the will theory through "a series of monumentally influential articles
on particular aspects of contract law between 1912 and 1918 ....
122 See GILMORE, supra note 3, at 66-79.
123 Id. at 71.
124 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 15, at 58.
125 Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Noncoercive State, 38
PoL. Sci. Q. 470 (1923).
126 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 86, at Iviii ("[B]y the 1930s the scholars actively
writing in American public law generally agreed that law is the creation and elaboration of
social policy.").
127 See id. at lxv ("The realists tended to approach law from a positivist stance, at least
temporarily accepting the law as it was and studying its regularities . . . .").
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Starting in the 1940s, the "legal process" school arose and de-radi-
calized legal realism, and by the 1950s was the predominant mode of
legal thought.128 The legal process approach arose in part because "the
New Deal and war experiences had given government a good name." 29
Under this approach, a government decision was acceptable as long as it
was made by the appropriate decision maker articulating a reasoned anal-
ysis.i30 Scholars also came to accept that common-law judicial reason-
ing involved a balancing of competing policies when the law had
conflicts, gaps, or ambiguities.' 3 ' Also, with the decline of formalism
came a new emphasis on standards instead of rules.132
For contract law, the seminal legal process piece was Lon Fuller's
1941 article Consideration and Form.'33 Fuller eschewed grand theories
of contract law and argued that contract doctrines should be assessed by
how well they implement a series of procedural and substantive policies
imminent within contract law. 134 He asserted that "each doctrine, in each
application, will represent an ad hoc amalgam of different-even con-
flicting-policies, whose particular significance and net direction can
only be assessed on a case-by-case basis, doctrine-by-doctrine basis." 35
Fuller rejected the idea that contract law could be traced to a single fun-
damental principle such as "will," and argued that "contract law served
several functions, which were often in conflict." 36 He argued that "pol-
icy analysis requires nuanced reasoning about the appropriate weight to
be given various policies in particular cases and when interpreting partic-
ular rules."' 37 Professor Duncan Kennedy has argued that Fuller's article
inaugurated the method of "conflicting considerations" jurisprudence.' 38
The legal process school would prevail until the mid-1960s.139
128 Kennedy & Fisher III, supra note 4, at 210.
129 Id. at 209.
130 Id. at 246.
131 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, in THE CANON OF
AMERICAN LEGAi THOUGir 603, 606 (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III, eds., 2006)
(By the 1950s it was accepted "that sensible judicial practice, particularly in the face of con-
flicts, gaps, or ambiguities in the legal materials, required judges to reason about conse-
quences, about the distributional effects of their decisions . . . . It was well understood,
moreover, that doing so would require the judge to balance conflicting policies and pur-
poses."); see generally NEIL DuxI3URY, PAITERNS OF AMiERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 205-99
(1995) (providing a thorough discussion of the legal process school).
132 See Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAIF. L. RFv. 1151, 1259
(1985) (recognizing that the decline of formalism resulted in the greater use of standards).
133 Fuller, supra note 14.
'34 See id. at 799-800.
135 Kennedy & Fisher III, supra note 4, at 213.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 213-14.
138 Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon
Fuller's "Consideration and Form," 100 Coi um. L. REv. 94, 94 (2000).
139 Kennedy & Fisher III, supra note 4, at 243.
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During the legal process era, classical contract law (according to
Gilmore) died.14 0 During this era, legislatures and courts interfered with
classical contract law doctrines in various ways, including protecting the
promisee's reliance and restitution interests.141 Particular inroads on
classical contract law included: (1) the rise of promissory estoppel as a
substitute for a bargain,14 2 (2) increased recoveries under a restitution
theory,143 (3) the expanded availability of excuses for non-perform-
ance,"'" (4) expanded remedies for breach,14 5 (5) the development of the
doctrine of unconscionability,14 6 (6) the rise of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing,14 7 and (7) decreased emphasis on the written
document.14 8
Notable examples of the inroads on classical contract law included
the spread of promissory estoppel into commercial transactions in cases
such as Drennan v. Star Paving Co.14 9 in 1958 (decided by Justice Tray-
nor and implicitly rejecting a Learned Hand opinion)o50 and Hoffman v.
Red Owl Stores, Inc.'5 1 in 1965. Traynor's opinion in Drennan was par-
ticularly significant because it not only imported promissory estoppel
into a commercial transaction, but also because the promise that formed
the basis for the claim was implied.15 2 To make matters worse (for class-
ical contract supporters), Traynor stated that the promise was "implied in
fact or law," apparently believing it did not matter which it was.153
Promissory estoppel could even be used to enforce a promise that was
part of a bargained-for- exchange that was otherwise unenforceable be-
cause it lacked material terms.15 4
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)-primarily writ-
ten in the 1940s155-represented the most radical break from classical
contract law. Its most important change was perhaps not a shift in the
substantive principles or policies underlying contract law, but a shift
140 GILMORE, supra note 3, at 1.
141 Id. at 61-93.
142 Id. at 73.
143 Id. at 81.
144 Id. at 89-91.
145 Id. at 91-93.
146 D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARiz. L. REv.
1, 6-7 (2009).
147 Id.
148 Knapp, supra note 66, at 767-69.
149 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958).
150 The Learned Hand opinion is James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir.
1933).
151 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
152 333 P.2d at 760.
153 See id.
154 See, e.g., Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 96-97 (Tex. 1965).
155 Franklin G. Snyder, Clouds of Mystery: Dispelling the Realist Rhetoric of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 68 OHIO Sr. L.J. 11, 25 (2007).
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from rules-dominance to standards-dominance.1 56 The UCC signaled
this change by defining "agreement" as "the bargain of the parties in fact
as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances
including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of perform-
ance ... . "57 Thus, while re-emphasizing classical contract law's princi-
ple of autonomy,' 58 the UCC directs courts to consider all evidence to
determine the agreement's content, rather than apply rigid rules.
Under the UCC a contract could be established even if it was un-
clear when it had been formed,159 and even if the offer and the accept-
ance conflicted.1 60 Even a Cardozo opinion was rejected, as the UCC
provided that a court could enforce a contract that failed to identify the
price for the goods by supplying the omitted term (as long as the parties
intended to form a contract).161 Furthermore, no matter how complete a
written contract appeared, evidence of trade usage, course of dealing, and
course of performance were admissible to determine the agreement's
terms.162 The desire to get at the "real deal," and not let rules get in the
way, expanded beyond the UCC. For example, in California, the parol
evidence rule was almost obliterated 6 3 and the plain meaning doctrine
rejected because words only have meaning in context.'*
But the UCC also included many provisions designed to provide for
more government regulation of contracts. As Professor Franklin Snyder
notes:
[Karl Llewellyn, the father of the UCC] believed that
government control of industry during World War II
proved that managed production was less 'blind and
wasteful' than the previous laissez-faire regime. In
short, he wanted to replace (though the word he used
156 See Richard E. Speidel, Afterword: The Shifting Domain of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L.
REv. 254, 260 (1995) (noting the UCC's emphasis on standards).
,57 U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1977) (emphasis added).
158 See John E. Murray, Jr., The Article 2 Prism: The Underlying Philosophy of Article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 WASHI3URN L.J. 1, 21 ("The core of the prism is a
sophisticated judicial appreciation of the search for the legitimate and reasonable factual bar-
gain of the parties regardless of which facet of the prism is used to illuminate the controversy
before the court.").
159 U.C.C. § 2-204(2).
160 Id. § 2-207.
161 Id. § 2-305. The Cardozo opinion is Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v. Remington
Paper & Power Co., 235 N.Y. 338 (1923).
162 U.C.C. § 2-202.
163 See Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 564-66 (1968); see also Madeline Plasencia,
Who's Afraid of flumpty Dumpty: Deconstructionist References in Judicial Opinions, 21 SEAT-
TiE U. L. Riv 215, 241 (1997) (asserting that Masterson and two other decisions virtually
eliminated the parol evidence rule in California).
164 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641,
644-45 (Cal. 1968).
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was 'adjust') the rough-and-tumble hard bargaining of
classical capitalism with a 'balanced' statute that would
specify the rights and obligations of the parties. What
business people actually wanted was largely irrelevant.
Llewellyn had an objective in drafting Article 2. He was
not fixing an 'outdated' legal system . . . . Rather, he
objected to the social and political premises on which
that system was based and wanted to wipe it away. He
wanted to replace the largely laissez-faire rules of classi-
cal contract law with a New Deal regulatory scheme, to
'carry on the program of the National Recovery Act after
it was declared unconstitutional' by establishing a mech-
anism for enforcing 'fair commercial practices.' He was
trying to impose 'his own normative vision' of a market-
place purged of sordid, unregulated competition of the
actual business world of his day, and policed by
merchant groups and the state.' 65
But while these various inroads into classical contract law would
make their way into the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, some schol-
ars maintain that the general outlines of classical contract law remained
and current contract law is therefore best described as "neo-classical."' 6 6
While perhaps true, there is still no doubt that inroads were made.
When the legal process consensus was shattered in the late 1960s, it
was replaced by "an array of methodologies associated variously with
economics, sociology, liberal theory, and the work of critical legal stud-
ies scholars." 67 Some even suggested that contract law did not really
matter.168 Importantly for our purposes, though, contact law theories
premised on the principle of autonomy reemerged, with Charles Fried
publishing Contract as Promise in 1981 in response to theorists such as
Gilmore who had argued that contract law was dead, having been sub-
sumed into tort law.169 Fried argued that "[t]he regime of contract law,
which respects the dispositions individuals make of their rights, carries to
its natural conclusion the liberal premise that individuals have rights.
And the will theory of contract, which sees contractual obligation as es-
sentially self-imposed, is a fair implication of liberal individualism." 70
165 Snyder, supra note 155, at 14 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
166 See Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 737,
738 (2000).
167 Kennedy & Fisher III, supra note 4, at 11.
168 See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 AM. Soc. REv. 55, 55 (1963).
169 FRIED, supra note 10.
170 Id. at 2.
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The policy of using law to promote efficiency also reemerged in the
1970s with the law and economics movement.' 7'
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S AUTHORITY OVER
LABOR RELATIONS PROMISES
Unlike a state common law court, the Supreme Court only has au-
thority over contract matters to the extent the U.S. Constitution provides
it with authority. The Constitution vests the Supreme Court with the
"judicial Power," 72 and relevant to our purposes, this power extends to
all cases "arising under . . . the Laws of the United States."' 73
A. The Wagner Act of 1935
In the early 1930s, scholars viewed labor relations as an area where
notions of freedom of contract resulted in injustice. For example, Morris
Cohen argued that in certain areas, including labor relations, there was
no true freedom of contract.174 As Duncan Kennedy recognized, Cohen
''wanted to argue that regulation in areas like labor law was justified
because there was no 'real freedom' under freedom of contract because
of unequal bargaining power, and that regulation actually increased 'real
freedom.' "'1
In 1935, Congress responded to concerns that there was no true
freedom of contract in labor relations by enacting the National Labor
Relations Act, also known as the Wagner Act (the Act or Labor Act).' 76
The Wagner Act was "perhaps the most radical piece of legislation ever
enacted by the United States Congress."' 77 It was a triumph of an instru-
mentalist, as opposed to an individualist, conception of law, and part of
an attack started in the 1900s upon the will theory of contracts. It was
also part of the return to status from contract. Duncan Kennedy de-
scribes the idea of removing labor contracts from the domain of tradi-
tional contract law as follows:
Instrumentalizing the contract principle in this way gave
a new twist to the argument for 'segregating the will the-
ory, or freedom of contract. The segregation argument
171 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 12; Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REy. 1089
(1972); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
172 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
173 Id. § 2.
174 Cohen, supra note 73, at 590 n.27.
175 Kennedy, supra note 138, at 151.
176 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. H§ 151-169 (2006)).
177 See Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 265 (1978).
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was that law makers should depart from freedom of con-
tract whenever they concluded that the instrumental ben-
efits of adhering to it were outweighed by the
drawbacks. There were two important reasons for
choosing another regime than freedom of contract. First,
parties within some specified sub-domain of the econ-
omy, such as labor management relations, were not re-
ally 'free'. That is, there was grossly unequal bargaining
power, so that the benefits of the property/contract re-
gime would be distributed in a manner not legitimated
by "true consent." Second, the practical or real world
results of operating the regime were inconsistent with
'the public interest,' defined either in terms of spill-over
effects, for example labor unrest disrupting the econ-
omy, or in terms of a very loose conception of the com-
mon or national good. 17
Congress enacted the Wagner Act under its power to regulate inter-
state commerce, and two years later the Supreme Court declared the Act
constitutional.17 9 The fact that the Wagner Act was passed under Con-
gress' commerce clause power shows that the Act was primarily a policy
statute, and not primarily premised on principles. The Wagner Act, at
least on its face, gave little power to the Supreme Court over matters
involving labor relations promises. The Court was simply provided with
appellate jurisdiction over unfair labor practice cases decided by a newly
formed agency, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).180 Con-
gress likely created an administrative agency to hear such cases because
it was perceived that courts did not have the time or the special abilities
to hear labor cases; 81 it was dissatisfied with the courts' development of
labor policy; 1 82 it wanted an agency that, freed from stare decisis, would
be flexible and able to experiment with labor policies;' 83 and it was cus-
178 Kennedy, supra note 138, at 123-24.
179 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937).
180 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, § 10(e), (f) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 160(e), (f)).
181 See t NAr'iL LABOR RELATIONs Bo., LEGsiATIVE HisToRy oF'ruE NATIONAL LABOR
RFLATIONs ACr, 1935, at 1428 (1985) (recording Senator Wagner as stating, "For years law-
yers and economists have pleaded for a dignified administrative tribunal, detached from any
particular administration that happens to be in power, and entitled to deal quasi-judicially with
issues with which the courts have neither the time nor the special facilities to cope.").
182 See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board and
the Court, 1968 Sur. Cr. Rev. 53, 59 n.5 ("The creation of the Board ... may fairly be viewed
as the result of congressional dissatisfaction with judicial lawmaking in the area of labor
law.").
183 Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board, 37 ADMIN L. Ruv. 163, 167
(1985); Winter, supra note 182, at 55.
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tomary at the time to create administrative agencies to enforce such
statutes.184
There were various principles and polices underlying the Act. The
Act's general purpose was "to promote union organization and to make
unions powerful."18 5 But why? First, as previously mentioned, Con-
gress believed that employees did not have true freedom of contract
when negotiating with employers.18 6 Thus, the Act promoted the princi-
ple of autonomy (albeit by restricting employers' autonomy). Second,
the Act sought to redistribute wealth from employers to employees.187
The Act's specific provisions sought to accomplish this by giving legal
protection and support to collective bargaining.' 88
But the Act's ultimate goals were policy goals, not the principles of
autonomy and redistribution of wealth. According to the Act's declara-
tion of policy, promoting employee autonomy would reduce industrial
strife, including strikes, which had burdened or affected commerce.1 89
Wealth redistribution would increase employee purchasing power, which
would in turn temper recurrent business depressions.190 Thus, although
184 Kenneth M. Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An Interview with Leon Keyserling on
Drafting the Wagner Act, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 285, 321 (1987) (quoting Leon H. Keyserling,
Senator Robert F. Wagner's legislative assistant at the time of the Wagner Act's drafting, and
its principal draftsman, as stating, "The administrative provisions are merely commonplace to
any administrative statute that has to be enforced.").
185 Klare, supra note 177, at 283 n.56; see also Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in
Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 1407 (1958) ("The most important purpose of the Wag-
ner Act was to create aggregations of economic power on the side of employees countervailing
the existing power of corporations to establish labor standards."); Clyde Summers, Collective
Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE LJ. 525, 571-72 n.151 (1969) ("A central
purpose of the labor relations statutes was to 'equalize bargaining power' by creating collec-
tive economic strength on the employees' side to match the collective economic strength on
the employers' side.").
186 See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, § 1 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006)) (noting that employees "do not possess full free-
dom of association or actual liberty of contract.").
187 See id. (noting that employer practices had diminished wages).
188 See id. (stating that the Act's goal is to encourage "the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining" and to protect "the exercise by workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing.").
189 See id. (stating that "[t]he denial by employers of the right of employees to organize
and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes
and other forms of industrial strife or unrest . . . ."); Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295 (1959) ("The goal of federal labor policy, as expressed in the Wag-
ner and Taft-Hartley Acts, is the promotion of collective bargaining; to encourage the em-
ployer and the representative of employees to establish, through collective negotiation, their
own charter for the ordering of industrial relations, and thereby to minimize industrial strife.").
190 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372; see also IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE Ni'w DEAL
CoiLL-Ecivn. BARGAINING POUICY 90 (1950) ("Industrial concentration, the declaration argued,
destroyed the worker's bargaining power, leaving him with an inadequate share of the national
wealth. A redistribution of income by collective bargaining would raise those at the bottom
and remove inequalities within the wage structure. This would benefit society as a whole by
creating mass purchasing power to fill in the troughs in the business cycle.").
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the Act promoted the principles of autonomy (in certain ways) and
wealth redistribution, its primary goal was a policy: improving the
economy. 191
With Lochner's demise in the 1930s,192 Congress had the power to
abrogate traditional contract law, and the Wagner Act altered classical
contract law (and its emphasis on autonomy) in several specific ways.
First, the Act required employers to negotiate with unions over the terms
and conditions of employment.193 This deviated from classical contract
law's refusal to compel persons to negotiate with each other, which was
grounded in notions of autonomy.19 4 The Supreme Court ultimately con-
strued this duty to negotiate as including a requirement that employers
and unions share relevant information during the contracting process, an-
other infringement upon autonomy. 195
Second, the Act (as construed) prohibited employers from negotiat-
ing with individual employees once a union became the employees' rep-
resentative. 196 This infringed upon the autonomy of employers and
employees to deal directly with one another.
Third, the Act prohibited employers from refusing to employ, or
from terminating, persons because they had engaged in union activi-
ties.197 As has been recognized, this had a strongly anti-contractualist
overtone.198 The at-will employment doctrine was a logical outgrowth of
classical contract law. If contract law was premised on the autonomy of
persons, an employer should not be held liable for ending an employment
relationship unless the employer had made a promise of job security.199
191 Of course, this stated policy basis might have been based on needing to demonstrate
that the Act was within Congress' Commerce Clause power.
192 See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
193 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2006) (providing that it is an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees . . .").
194 See Harry H. Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 467, 468 (1964) ("No one thinks of the collective bargaining agree-
ment as the perfect example of a free contract. In labor relations there is no freedom of choice,
for example, with respect to one's contracting partner."). As Dean Shulman noted, "if the law
commands that some particular item must be made the subject of bargaining and may not be
the object of a firm demand for unilateral control, then to that extent the law interferes with the
parties' autonomy and shapes the content of their bargain." Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract,
and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. Riv. 999, 1001 (1955).
195 See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956) (holding that employer had
duty to disclose financial information to union when employer refused wage increase based on
alleged inability to pay).
196 See ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATHEw W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW:
UNIONIZATION AND COLLEc-rvE BARGAINING 510-11 (2d ed. 2004).
197 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (providing that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
to discriminate based on union activities).
198 Klare, supra note 177, at 294, n.91.
199 See Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen, A Subjective Approach to Contracts?: How Courts
Interpret Employee Handbook Disclaimers, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 101, 105 (2008)
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Fourth, by making a certified union the exclusive representative of
all the employees in the designated bargaining unit, the Act bound em-
ployees to the terms of an agreement they had perhaps never consented
to, a significant infringement on autonomy. 200 Thus, once a union is
established, the Act ensures that "[t]he individual employee loses almost
entirely his freedom of contract." 2 0 1
But the infringement on autonomy was supposed to end there. Sena-
tor Walsh, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Education and La-
bor, stated:
When the employees have chosen their organization,
when they have selected their representatives, all the bill
proposes to do is to escort them to the door of the em-
ployer and say, "Here they are, the legal representatives
of your employees." What happens behind those doors is
not inquired into, and this bill does not seek to inquire
into it.202
Similarly, in upholding the Act's constitutionality, the Court stated
that "in its present application, the statute goes no further than to safe-
guard the right of employees to self-organization and to select represent-
atives of their own choosing for collective bargaining or other mutual
protection without restraint or coercion by their employer." 2 0 3 The Court
further stated that "[t]he act does not compel agreements between em-
ployers and employees. It does not compel any agreement whatever. It
does not prevent the employer 'from refusing to make a collective con-
tract and hiring individuals on whatever terms' the employer 'may by
unilateral action determine.' "204 The Supreme Court reemphasized this
in a subsequent opinion:
The National Labor Relations Act is designed to pro-
mote industrial peace by encouraging the making of vol-
(noting the relationship between the at-will employment doctrine and the will theory of
contracts).
200 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) ("Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other condi-
tions of employment." (emphasis added)).
201 Summers, supra note 185, at 531. Further elaborating on this premise, Summers ex-
plains, "[the employee] is barred from bargaining on his own behalf or through any other
representative, and he is bound by the agreement made by the majority union even when he is
not a member, prefers individual bargaining, and opposes the specific terms negotiated by the
union." Id.
202 79 CONG. Ric. 7660 (1935).
203 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
204 Id. at 45 (quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 549 n.6
(1937)).
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untary agreements governing relations between unions
and employers. The Act does not compel any agreement
whatsoever between employees and employers. Nor
does the Act regulate the substantive terms governing
wages, hours and working conditions which are incorpo-
rated in an agreement. The theory of the Act is that the
making of voluntary labor agreements is encouraged by
protecting employees' rights to organize for collective
bargaining and by imposing on labor and management
the mutual obligation to bargain collectively. 205
Congress thus viewed the Act as promoting freedom of contract, not
infringing upon it.206 As stated by the late Dean Shulman, "[t]his limited
intervention by the law, it is argued, is not an impairment of the freedom
of contract but rather a means of making it effective." 207 As he recog-
nized, "[t]his bare legal framework is hardly an encroachment on the
premise that wages and other conditions of employment be left to auton-
omous determination by employers and labor. On the contrary, it merely
establishes the conditions necessary for the exercise of that auton-
omy." 20 8 In this sense, it is purely a procedural statute.
But the extent to which the Wagner Act replaced common law con-
tract doctrine is an issue that has divided scholars. Some maintain that
the Wagner Act removed collective bargaining law from the realm of
contract law.209 For example, Professor Karl Klare stated, "[I]t is widely
believed today that the Wagner Act effected a detachment of labor rela-
tions from the law of contracts that had previously governed it."210 But
Klare also maintains that this is misleading, and that "[c]ontract is alive
and well in the law of labor relations." 2 11
At the time of the Act's passage, it was not clear how much the
government would interfere with the substantive terms of employ-
205 NLRB v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1952).
206 See id.
207 Shulman, supra note 194, at 1001-02.
208 Id. at 1000.
209 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 54, at 24 ("The most dramatic changes touching the signifi-
cance of contract law in modem life . . . came about, not through internal developments in
contract law, but through developments in public policy which systematically robbed contract
of its subject matter. Some of the best known of these developments have been mentioned-
labor law, antitrust law, insurance law, business regulation, and social welfare legislation. The
growth of these specialized bodies of public policy removed from 'contract' (in the sense of
abstract relationships) transactions and situations formerly governed by it.").
210 Klare, supra note 177, at 293.
211 Id. at 293-94.
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ment.212 As Professor Klare notes, "[i]f the duty to bargain were, as once
feared, to be interpreted as requiring the making of objectively reasona-
ble proposals and counterproposals, it threatened to involve the state di-
rectly in the determination of terms and conditions of employment, a
manifest threat to traditional contractualist notions."2 13
B. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947
After the Wagner Act's passage, critics argued that the statute "was
one-sided legislation, slanted heavily in favor of organized labor . . . ."214
After World War II, a campaign to amend the Act was launched, relying
upon public belief that unions had been acting irresponsibly and improp-
erly by striking during the war; using mass picketing during strikes; en-
gaging in secondary boycotts; engaging in jurisdictional disputes with
other unions; and engaging in misconduct in internal union affairs. 215 As
a result, in 1947 the Republican controlled Congress enacted, over Presi-
dent Truman's veto, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, also known as the
Labor Management Relations Act.2 16
Importantly, Section 301(b) permitted unions to sue and be sued,
reversing the common law rule. 2 17 But the most important provision of
the Taft-Hartley Act for purposes of this Article is § 301(a), which
provided:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and
a labor organization representing employees in an indus-
try affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or be-
tween any such labor organizations, may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction
of the parties, without respect to the amount in contro-
versy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties. 218
On its face, § 301(a) was simply procedural, doing nothing more
than providing federal courts with original jurisdiction over suits alleging
212 See id. at 288 n.73 (noting that Congress did not think through the problem of whether
Section 8(a)(5)'s duty to bargain would permit "the NLRB to engage in substantive scrutiny of
employer proposals in the course of its administration ....
213 Id. at 294 n.91 (citation omitted).
214 1 THE DEvELOP'ING LABOR LAw 32 (John E. Higgins, Jr., ed., 5th ed. 2006).
215 Id. at 33.
216 Id. at 40-41.
217 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957) ("Sec-
tion 301(b) makes it possible for a labor organization, representing the employees in an indus-
try affecting commerce, to sue and be sued as an entity in the federal courts. Section 301(b) in
other words provides the procedural remedy lacking at common law.").
218 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 61 Stat. 136, § 301 (1947).
1212012]
122 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
the breach of a collective bargaining agreement. 219 The legislative his-
tory reveals that the provision's purpose was simply to ensure that unions
(in addition to employers) would be bound by collective bargaining
agreements. 220 The Act's legislative history further provided that
"[o]nce parties have made a collective bargaining contract the enforce-
ment of that contract should be left to the usual processes of the
law . . . ."221 Also, the agreement's substance was not to be dictated by
the government. 222
But the Taft-Hartley Act might have unintentionally opened a can of
worms. If any tension existed between freedom of contract and the Wag-
ner Act's goals of industrial peace and redistributing wealth, the task of
accommodation would now be for the federal courts in addition to the
NLRB, inasmuch as the federal courts were given jurisdiction over the
alleged breach of collective bargaining agreements. 223
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND LABOR RELATIONS PROMISES
A. The Supreme Court and Labor Relations Promises During the
Contract is Dead/Legal Process Era (1940s to 1969)
The Supreme Court's first significant ruling regarding labor rela-
tions promises after the Wagner Act came in 1944 in J.l. Case Co. v.
NLRB. 2 2 4 In J.I. Case, the Court addressed how promises in individual
employment contracts were to be treated once the NLRB certified a
219 See Donald H. Wollett & Harry H. Wellington, Federalism and Breach of the Labor
Agreement, 7 STAN. L. REV. 445, 446 (1955).
220 The Senate Report provided:
If unions can break agreements with relative impunity, then such agreements do
not tend to stabilize industrial relations. The execution of an agreement does not by
itself promote industrial peace. The chief advantage which an employer can reason-
ably expect from a collective labor agreement is assurance of uninterrupted opera-
tion during the term of the agreement. Without some effective method of assuring
freedom from economic warfare for the term of the agreement, there is little reason
why an employer would desire to sign such a contract.
Consequently, to encourage the making of agreements and to promote industrial
peace through faithful performance by the parties, collective agreements . . . should
be enforceable in the Federal courts.
Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 454 (quoting S. Rep. No. 105, at 16 (1947)).
221 H.R. Rep. No. 510, at 41-42 (1947) (Conf. Rep.).
222 See Archibald Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MIcH.
L. REV. 1, 3 (1958) ("The terms of the bargain are not determined by the government . . . .");
Summers, supra note 185, at 531 ("Although the law requires bargaining and channels the
bargaining process, it does not compel agreement nor dictate the terms of settlement. The
substantive terms are those negotiated and agreed to by the parties in a bargained exchange.")
(footnotes omitted).
223 See Wellington, supra note 194, at 479 ("[T]o the extent that litigation under the sec-
tion exposes tension between the policies of industrial peace and freedom of contract, the task
of accommodation . . . is a task for the courts alone.").
224 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
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union as the exclusive representative of a group of employees. 2 2 5 Under
traditional contract law doctrine, the Court would have no basis for hold-
ing individual employment contracts superseded by a collective agree-
ment unless the individual employee and the employer agreed that the
collective agreement would act as a substituted agreement.
In J.I. Case, an employer offered one-year employment contracts to
its employees. 226 The employees were not required to enter into the con-
tracts as a condition of employment, but about 75% of them did.2 2 7 At
the time these contracts were formed, the employees lacked union repre-
sentation. 2 2 8 Accordingly, the individual employment agreements were
lawfully obtained. 229 Four and a half months after the individual con-
tracts went into effect, a union petitioned the NLRB for certification as
the exclusive representative of the production and maintenance employ-
ees. 2 3 0 The employer maintained that the individual contracts were a bar
to the union's petition.2 3 1 The NLRB rejected the employer's position
and directed an election. 232 The union won, and the NLRB certified the
union as the employees' exclusive representative. 233 When the union
sought to bargain, the employer refused to bargain over any matters cov-
ered by the individual contracts until they expired. 234
The Wagner Act (as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act) does not
explicitly address the effect of individual contracts on the duty to bar-
gain. The NLRB, however, found the employer's refusal to have vio-
lated § 8(a)(5) of the Act and directed the employer, among other things,
to stop giving effect to the individual contracts. 2 3 5 Despite a court of
appeals order enforcing the NLRB's order, the individual contracts expir-
ing, and a collective agreement having been entered into between the
parties, the Supreme Court heard the case because "[t]he issues are unset-
tled ones important in the administration of the Act." 2 3 6
The Court noted that "[c]ontract in labor law is a term the implica-
tions of which must be determined from the connection in which it ap-
pears." 2 3 7 The Court then stated that once an employee is employed, he
"becomes entitled by virtue of the Labor Relations Act somewhat as a
225 Id. at 334.
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third party beneficiary to all benefits of the collective trade agreement,
even if on his own terms he would yield to less favorable terms. The
individual hiring contract is subsidiary to the terms of the trade agree-
ment and may not waive any of its benefits . . . ."238
The Court acknowledged, however, that the Act did not include an
express provision regarding the existence of individual contracts and a
collective agreement. 239 The Court nevertheless made a strong statement
in favor of the Act's policies, and the trumping of individual contracts
that impeded those policies:
Individual contracts, no matter what the circumstances
that justify their execution or what their terms, may not
be availed of to defeat or delay the procedures prescribed
by the National Labor Relations Act looking to collec-
tive bargaining, nor to exclude the contracting employee
from a duly ascertained bargaining unit; nor may they be
used to forestall bargaining or to limit or condition the
term of the collective bargaining agreement. 'The Board
asserts a public right vested in it as a public body,
charged in the public interest with the duty of preventing
unfair labor practices.' Wherever private contracts con-
flict with its functions, they obviously must yield or the
Act would be reduced to a futility.240
The Court then held that because the collective agreement is to
serve the Act's contemplated purposes, an individual employment con-
tract could not effectively waive any of the benefits of the collective
bargaining agreement. 24 1 The Court stressed that
The very purpose of providing by statute for collective
agreement is to supersede the terms of separate agree-
ment of employees with terms which reflect the strength
and bargaining power and serve the welfare of the group.
Its benefits and advantages are open to every employee
of the represented unit, whatever the type or terms of his
pre-existing contract of employment. 242
In response to the argument that some employees might be able to
negotiate individual contracts more favorable to them than the collective
agreement, and that restricting his ability to do so infringed upon his
238 Id. at 336.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 337 (citation omitted) (quoting Nat'l Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 364
(1940).
241 Id. at 338.
242 Id.
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freedom of contract, the Court stated that such contracts could be disrup-
tive to industrial peace because they would interfere with union organiz-
ing in that such advantages would often be earned at the expense of some
group, and under the Labor Act, the majority rules. 2 4 3 Under the Act's
philosophy, individual advantages "will generally in practice go in as a
contribution to the collective result." 244 Thus, in J.l. Case, the statute's
policy goals outweighed the importance of autonomy for individual em-
ployees and their employers.
The Court's decision in J.I. Case correctly minimized the autonomy
principle. First, the employment of those employees who had individual
contracts was in no way threatened. Thus, the most important aspect of
the parties' autonomy-the agreement to have an employment relation-
ship-remained intact. Second, a collective agreement would replace the
individual employment contracts, and it was possible, perhaps even
likely, that the terms of the collective agreement would be more
favorable to the employees than those in the individual agreements
(thereby promoting wealth redistribution). Third, the individual con-
tracts threatened the union's success, and thus the Act's policy goals out-
weighed the autonomy principle. Fourth, the case upheld the NLRB's
decision in an unfair labor practice proceeding, and the NLRB "is vested
with authority to develop 'national labor policy' .. . ."245
What is most significant, however, about the J.I. Case decision is
not its holding, but rather the fact that the Court did not have to hear the
case at all, but chose to anyway. The Court did so to send a strong
message that policy concerns would prevail over notions of freedom of
contract for individual employees and their employers.
In 1953, the Warren Court era began and would last until 1969.246
During this era, the enactment of § 301 in 1947 gave rise to the Supreme
Court's leading cases involving labor law promises and collective bar-
gaining agreements. With jurisdiction over disputes involving alleged
breaches of collective bargaining agreements, the key question was
whether the Court would follow classical contract law doctrine or the
legal process approach of balancing competing principles and policies
(the "contract is dead" approach).
The Court's 1956 decision in Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB sent
an early message that the Warren Court intended to follow the "contract
is dead" approach. 247 In that case, the union and the employer entered
243 Id. at 338-39.
244 Id. at 339.
245 Matthew Finkin & Sanford Jacoby, The National Labor Relations Board in Compara-
tive Context, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & Po 'y J. 159, 219 (2005).
246 BERNARo SCHWARTZ7, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 263 (1993).
247 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
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into a collective bargaining agreement that included a no-strike promise
by the union. 248 During the agreement's term, the employer engaged in
unfair labor practices in an effort to rid itself of the incumbent union and
replace it with another union.249 In response, the employees went on
strike. 250 The employer terminated the striking employees, and the em-
ployees asserted their termination was an unfair labor practice. 251 In de-
fense the employer relied on the no-strike provision. 252
Even though the Court acknowledged that the case "turn[ed] upon
the proper interpretation of the particular contract," it then stated that the
contract must be read "in the light of the law relating to it when
made." 2 5 3 Although the no-strike provision was a broad promise "to re-
frain from engaging in any strike or work stoppage during the term of
this agreement," the Court interpreted the provision as prohibiting only
economic strikes. 254 The Court suggested that although the privilege to
engage in an unfair labor practice strike could be contractually waived,
any such waiver would need to be explicit. 2 5 5 Thus, the Court injected
federal labor policy into the interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement.
The next term (in 1957), the Court again made it clear that federal
labor policy would play a significant role in the interpretation of collec-
tive bargaining agreements. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of
Alabama,256 the court held that the substantive law to be applied in a
§ 301 suit "is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy
of our national labor laws." 2 5 7 The emphasis on federal labor policy in-
dicated that Courts were not to simply draw the substantive law from
classical contract law.2 5 8
248 Id. at 281.
249 Id.at 271-74.
250 Id. at 274.
251 Id. at 273-76.
252 Id. at 277.
253 Id. at 279.
254 Id. at 281. Professor Cox maintained that the Court's decision "violates the plain and
inherently sensible meaning of the words ..... Cox, supra note 222, at 17.
255 Mastro, 350 U.S. at 283.
256 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
257 Id. at 456; see also Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S.
Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) ("[T]he pre-emptive force of § 301 is so powerful as to displace
entirely any state cause of action 'for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization.' Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that
state law would provide a cause of action in the absence of § 301.") (internal quotation marks
omitted); Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968) (holding that state courts must apply federal law in § 301 suit);
Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102 (1962) (same).
258 Summers, supra note 185, at 526.
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The Supreme Court's treatment of arbitration decisions in the
"Steelworkers Trilogy" in 1960 further demonstrated that the Warren
Court treated promises in labor relations differently from the way the
legal system had treated promises under classical contract law. In the
Steelworkers Trilogy, the Court relied heavily on the federal policy "to
promote industrial stabilization through the collective bargaining agree-
ment." 259 In United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Naviga-
tion Co.,260 the Court addressed whether the employer had breached the
collective bargaining agreement by refusing to submit to arbitration a
dispute over the contracting out of work. 26 1 The collective bargaining
agreement provided that "[i]f agreement [over a dispute about the collec-
tive bargaining agreement] has not been reached the matter shall be re-
ferred to an impartial umpire for decision." 262 The agreement also
provided, however, that "matters which are strictly a function of manage-
ment shall not be subject to arbitration." 263 The employer argued that
contracting out work was strictly a management function and therefore
was not covered by the arbitration provision. 26 4
The Court, in holding that it was for the arbitrator to decide whether
the matter was subject to arbitration, created a strong presumption in
favor of arbitration, rather than simply directing the court or arbitrator to
conduct a standard contract analysis. 2 6 5  The Court noted that
"[c]omplete effectuation of the federal policy is achieved when the
agreement contains both an arbitration provision for all unresolved griev-
ances and an absolute prohibition of strikes, the arbitration agreement
being the 'quid pro quo' for the agreement not to strike." 266 The Court
noted the different role arbitration provisions play in commercial con-
tracts and collective bargaining agreements: "In the commercial case, ar-
bitration is the substitute for litigation. Here arbitration is the substitute
for industrial strife." 267 The Court therefore held that "[an order to arbi-
trate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said
with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an
259 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960) (citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 453-454 (1957)).
260 363 U.S. 574.
261 Id. at 577.
262 Id. at 576.
263 Id. at 583.
264 Id. at 584.
265 See id. at 585; see also HARRY H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THI LFGAL PROCIss 103
(1968) ("Lower courts then are to approach the question of whether to order arbitration armed
with a strong affirmative presumption, a very strong presumption indeed.").
266 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 n.4
(1960).
267 Id. at 578.
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interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be re-
solved in favor of coverage." 268
The Court's opinion was grounded on two different notions. First,
it was grounded in a legal process notion that arbitrators have more insti-
tutional competence than judges to address such issues.269 Second, it
was grounded in the notion that arbitration promotes industrial peace.270
And as the late Professor Wellington recognized, this basis was contrary
to freedom of contract: "whatever the reasoning of the Court, the major-
ity opinion makes clear that in a suit to compel arbitration there is to be
no thoroughgoing judicial inquiry into whether the reluctant party in this
case promised to submit this dispute to arbitration." 2 7 1
The Court severely limited federal court review of an arbitrator's
decision construing a collective bargaining agreement in United Steel-
workers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp.272 (another case
in the Steelworkers Trilogy). Initially, the Court seemed to emphasize
traditional contract analysis when discussing the arbitrator's role:
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and applica-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not
sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He
may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet
his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its es-
sence from the collective bargaining agreement. When
the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obli-
gation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement
of the award.273
However, by refusing to review the merits of an arbitrator's con-
struction of a collective bargaining agreement, 274 the Court ceded tre-
mendous power to arbitrators, who would often be indifferent to the
niceties of traditional contract doctrine.
268 Id. at 582-83.
269 See Wellington, supra note 194, at 482-83 ("[Tlhe Court reasoned that since, as a
matter of comparative competence, the labor arbitrator has a substantial advantage over the lay
judge, every opportunity ought to be utilized to allow the better qualified decision-maker to
pass upon the central issue in the case.").
270 See id. at 483 ("The second reason adduced by the Court to support its rule is the
statutory policy of industrial peace . . . .
271 Id.
272 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
273 Id. at 597.
274 See id. at 599 ("[T]he question of interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement
is a question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for; and
so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no
business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his.").
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In fact, in United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufactur-
ing Co. 2 7 5 (the third case in the Steelworkers Trilogy) the Court chastised
the lower courts for their "preoccupation with ordinary contract law,"276
and rejected the Cutler-Hammer doctrine that treated the interpretation of
a collective bargaining agreement as an issue of law that courts were just
as capable of performing as arbitrators. 2 7 7 The Court even recognized
that a single collective agreement could have varying meanings when it
acknowledged that an arbitrator might be willing to entertain contract
disputes that a court would deem without merit.2 78 The Court viewed
arbitration as a stabilizing influence, and stated that "[i]n our role of de-
veloping a meaningful body of law to govern the interpretation and en-
forcement of collective bargaining agreements, we think special heed
should be given to the context in which collective bargaining agreements
are negotiated and the purpose which they are intended to serve." 2 79 The
Court's Steelworkers Trilogy therefore emphasized the policy of indus-
trial peace and deemphasized the autonomy principle.
In 1962, in Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 280 the Court
addressed whether a no-strike provision should be implied into a collec-
tive bargaining agreement. In Lucas Flour, the parties had entered into a
collective agreement that included a provision providing for arbitration
over any dispute, but which did not include an express no-strike provi-
sion other than one precluding a strike during an arbitration relating to
the agreement's interpretation. 2 8 1 When the employer fired an employee,
the union called a strike to force the employer to rehire the employee. 2 8 2
The employer brought suit against the union asserting that the strike was
in breach of the collective bargaining agreement. 283
The Court held that even though the agreement did not include an
express no-strike provision covering the instant strike (and in fact in-
cluded a no-strike provision covering a different situation), a strike to
compel the resolution of a grievance is contrary to an agreement that
includes a provision to settle grievances by arbitration. 284 The Court
275 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
276 Id. at 567.
277 Id. In International Association of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., a New York
appellate court held that "[i]f the meaning of the provision of the contract sought to be arbi-
trated is beyond dispute, there cannot be anything to arbitrate and the contract cannot be said
to provide for arbitration." 67 N.Y.S.2d 317, 318 (App. Div.), affd 297 N.Y. 519 (1947),
overruled by United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960).
278 Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567.
279 Id.
280 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
281 Id. at 96.
282 Id. at 97.
283 Id.
284 Id. at 105.
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stated that "[t]o hold otherwise would obviously do violence to accepted
principles of traditional contract law." 2 85 But the Court provided no ex-
planation as to how a contrary holding would do violence to accepted
principles of traditional contract law and did not even specify what those
principles were. It then moved quickly to the true basis for its holding,
federal labor policy, stating: "Even more in point, a contrary view would
be completely at odds with the basic policy of national labor legislation
to promote the arbitral process as a substitute for economic warfare." 28 6
Justice Black dissented, criticizing the Court for creating, instead of
finding, a no-strike provision. 287 (I quote Justice Black's dissenting
opinion at some length, because it shows just how far the Court's opinion
deviated from traditional contract interpretation.) Justice Black stated:
The Court now finds-out of clear air, so far as I can
see-that the union, without saying so in the agreement,
not only agreed to arbitrate such differences, but also
promised that there would be no strike while arbitration
of a dispute was pending under this provision. And on
the basis of its 'discovery' of this additional unwritten
promise by the union, the Court upholds a judgment
awarding the company substantial damages for a strike
in breach of contract. 288
Black argued that the Court was vacating and amending the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, 289 and pointed out that the parties knew how
to include a no-strike provision when they wanted one.290 He stated that:
"I had supposed, however-though evidently the Court thinks other-
wise-that the job of courts enforcing contracts was to give legal effect
to what the contracting parties actually agreed to do, not to what courts
think they ought to do."2 9 1
In response to the Court's statement that a contrary holding "would
obviously do violence to accepted principles of traditional contract
law," 2 9 2 Black asserted:
I have been unable to find any accepted principle of con-
tract law-traditional or otherwise-that permits courts
to change completely the nature of a contract by adding
new promises that the parties themselves refused to
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id. at 106 (Black, J., dissenting).
288 Id. at 106-07.
289 Id. at 107.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 108.
292 Id. at 105.
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make in order that the new court-made contract might
better fit into whatever social, economic, or legal poli-
cies the courts believe to be so important that they
should have been taken out of the realm of voluntary
contract by the legislative body and furthered by com-
pulsory legislation. 29 3
Black made it clear that he was not suggesting a collective bargain-
ing agreement could not have implied terms, but that an implied no-strike
clause could not be found in this agreement:
I do not mean to suggest that an implied contractual
promise cannot sometimes be found where there are
facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant the conclu-
sion that such was the intention of the parties. But there
is no factual basis for such a conclusion in this case and
the Court does not even claim to the contrary. The im-
plication of a no-strike clause which the Court purports
to find here-an implication completely at war with the
language the parties used in making this contract as well
as with the normal understanding of the negotiation pro-
cess by which such contracts are made-has not been
supposed by so much as one scrap of evidence in this
record. The implication found by the Court thus flows
neither from the contract itself nor, so far as this record
shows, from the intention of the parties. In my judg-
ment, an 'implication' of that nature would better be de-
scribed as a rigid rule of law that an agreement to
arbitrate has precisely the same effect as an agreement
not to strike-a rule of law which introduces revolution-
ary doctrine into the field of collective bargaining ....
Whatever else may be said about [the Taft-Hartley Act],
it seems plain that it was enacted on the view that the
best way to bring about industrial peace was through
voluntary, not compelled, labor agreements. Section 301
is torn from its roots when it is held to require the sort of
compulsory arbitration imposed by this decision. 294
Accordingly, as forcefully demonstrated by Justice Black, the Lucas
Flour decision was premised on federal labor policy, and had nothing to
do with promoting the autonomy principle.
293 Id. at 108 (Black, J., dissenting).
294 Id. at 109- 10.
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The high-water mark of the "collective bargaining agreements are
dead" school arose two years later in 1964 over the issue of whether a
collective bargaining agreement could be binding on an un-consenting
successor employer. 295 In John Wiley & Sons Inc., v. Livingston,296 a
union entered into a collective bargaining agreement with Interscience
Publishers, Inc. 2 9 7 The agreement did not include a provision making it
binding on Interscience's successors. 298 Four months prior to the expira-
tion of the agreement's term, Interscience, for bona fide reasons, merged
with John Wiley & Sons, Inc., a larger company without a union, and
Interscience ceased doing business as a separate entity.2 9 9 Wiley main-
tained that the merger terminated the agreement, whereas the union
maintained that Wiley was required to recognize certain "vested" em-
ployee rights under the agreement. 300 One week before the agreement's
expiration, the union filed a § 301 action to compel Wiley to submit to
arbitration the dispute about whether Wiley was bound by certain terms
in the agreement.301 The union did not sue under § 301 for the breach of
the agreement's substantive terms; rather, it merely sued for breach of
the arbitration provision.30 2
The primary question before the Court was therefore whether the
agreement's arbitration provision survived the merger 303 and not whether
any substantive provisions were binding on Wiley. 30o The union relied
on New York law, which provided that when corporations consolidate
"such consolidated corporation shall be deemed to have assumed and
shall be liable for all liabilities and obligations of each of the corpora-
tions consolidated in the same manner as if such consolidated corpora-
295 See Note, The Successor Employer's Duty to Arbitrate: A Reconsideration of John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 82 HARV. L. REv. 418, 420 (1968) ("When the original
contracting employer transfers his enterprise to a successor who does not consent to be bound
by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and the union sues to compel the new
employer to arbitrate the status of specific contractual rights under the old agreement, the
courts face squarely the issue of the nature of the collective bargaining agreement and their
own role in enforcing it.").
296 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
297 Id. at 544.
298 Id.
299 Id. at 544-45.
300 Id. at 545; see also Harry E. Reagan, III, Note, The Contractual Obligations of a
Successor Employer Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement of a Predecessor, 113 U. PA.
L. REv. 914, 924 n.53 (1965) ("Vested rights in this context refer to continuing obligations
which an employer is not free to disregard even upon termination of the contract, such as
pension payments.").
301 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 546.
302 See Reagan, supra note 300, at 924 ("[T]he union sought only to compel arbitration,
the only contract breach alleged having been the successor's refusal to arbitrate.").
303 Id.
304 See Note, supra note 295, at 422 ("The Court's holding in Wiley covers only the duty
to arbitrate; the Court's opinion explicitly leaves the question of the status of the employees'
rights under specific contract provisions to the arbitrator.").
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tion had itself incurred such liabilities or obligations."305 Alternatively,
the union argued that the arbitration provision should bind Wiley as a
matter of federal law. 3 0 6
The Court first held that federal law controlled. 307 The Court then
provided a cryptic holding:
We hold that the disappearance by merger of a corporate
employer which has entered into a collective bargaining
agreement with a union does not automatically terminate
all rights of the employees covered by the agreement,
and that, in appropriate circumstances, present here, the
successor employer may be required to arbitrate with the
union under the agreement. 308
The Court relied primarily on the federal policy in favor of settling
labor disputes by arbitration, stating that, "The transition from one corpo-
rate organization to another will in most cases be eased and industrial
strife avoided if employees' claims continue to be resolved by arbitration
rather than by 'the relative strength . . . of the contending forces.'"
3 09
Consistent with the decisions previously discussed, the John Wiley deci-
sion was thus based on promoting federal labor policy. As one commen-
tator stated, "the Court did not initially examine the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement as a whole in order to determine whether
the imposition of the duty to arbitrate on the nonconsenting successor
could be justified on any doctrine of implied consent .... "310
But the Court's discussion disclosed the confusing interplay be-
tween federal labor policy and consent notions of contract duty. The
Court was compelled to acknowledge that its holding could not be
squared with traditional contract doctrine, but its explanation seemed to
keep one foot in such doctrine, as perhaps it was required to do because
it acknowledged that a duty to arbitrate can only be based on a
contract.31'
The Court began by emphasizing federal labor policy, and deem-
phasizing traditional contract doctrine. The Court stated that "[w]hile the
principles of law governing ordinary contracts would not bind to a con-
tract an unconsenting successor to a contracting party, a collective bar-
305 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547-48, 548 n.2 (quoting N.Y. Bus. CORPU. LAW § 906 (McKinney
2003), formerly § 90 of the N.Y. Stock Corporation Law, McKinney's Consol. Laws, c. 59).
306 Id. at 548.
307 Id.
308 Id.
309 Id. at 549 (quoting United Steel Workers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960)).
3 10 Note, supra note 295, at 422-23.
311 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 550.
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gaining agreement is not an ordinary contract."312 The Court then relied
on "the principle that when a contract is scrutinized for evidence of an
intention to arbitrate a particular kind of dispute, national labor policy
requires, within reason, that 'an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute' be favored."3t 3 The Court then took the position that all that
was necessary to potentially bind Wiley was "a contract," even if it had
not been signed by Wiley.314 The Court, again relying on "the impres-
sive policy considerations favoring arbitration," 3 15 stated: "We thus find
Wiley's obligation to arbitrate this dispute in the Interscience contract
construed in the context of a national labor policy."3 16
But the Court then returned to the language of consent:
We do not hold that in every case in which the owner-
ship or corporate structure of an enterprise is changed
the duty to arbitrate survives . . . . [T]here may be cases
in which the lack of any substantial continuity of identity
in the business enterprise before and after a change
would make a duty to arbitrate something imposed from
without, not reasonably to be found in the particular bar-
gaining agreement and the acts of the parties
involved. 317
In essence, the Court required "that the underlying contract [be] at
least 'reasonably related' to the party being forced to arbitrate. 318
Strangely, though, satisfaction of this test would somehow be equated
with a type of consent by the successor. The Court, despite relying on
federal labor policy, seemed uncomfortable with detaching its rule com-
pletely from the classical contract law notion of autonomy. But the
Court's effort was unconvincing, and simply highlighted the fact that the
Court had reached the high-water mark of the "collective bargaining
agreements are dead" era. As one commentator recognized:
[T]he Court's assertion that Wiley's duty to arbitrate is
based upon the contractual obligation of its predecessor
construed in light of the national labor policy favoring
arbitration seems on initial analysis to be a fiction; in-
deed, the Court could be said to be imposing a duty to
312 Id. (footnote omitted); see also Note, supra note 295, at 420 ("Under ordinary contract
rules, the nonconsenting successor is not bound by the old agreement . . . .").
313 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 550 n.4 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582-83).
314 Id. at 550.
315 Id.
316 Id. at 550-51 (emphasis added).
317 Id. at 551.
318 Note, supra note 295, at 427.
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arbitrate, independent of any manifestation of Wiley's
willingness to submit to arbitration, in order to preserve
labor peace. 319
An important issue that the Court declined to address was whether
any of the substantive rights (not the arbitration provision) under the
agreement that might have vested with respect to Interscience would bind
Wiley. The Court concluded that it was the arbitrator's decision whether
the union's claims had merit, and that it was "sufficient for present pur-
poses that the demands are not so plainly unreasonable that the subject
matter of the dispute must be regarded as non-arbitrable . . . ."320 Thus,
the Court indicated that an arbitrator could reasonably conclude that Wi-
ley was bound by certain of Interscience's substantive contract duties if
the corollary employee contract rights had "vested" prior to the
merger.321
The Court was therefore holding that an un-consenting successor
can possibly be bound to some of the substantive terms of the predeces-
sor's collective agreement. Accordingly, any suggestion that Wiley was
simply about the federal labor policy of encouraging arbitration to re-
solve disputes is misplaced, and the decision rejected the importance of
the autonomy principle more than is commonly thought. Rather, the de-
cision was a strong statement that the federal labor policy of preventing
industrial strife would be promoted by binding successors to the substan-
tive terms of the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. As
stated by the Court: "The objectives of national labor policy, reflected in
established principles of federal law, require that the rightful prerogative
of owners independently to rearrange their businesses and even eliminate
themselves as employers be balanced by some protection to the employ-
ees from a sudden change in the employment relationship." 322
An interesting aspect of Wiley is that the Court could have disposed
of the case under "the general rule that in the case of merger the surviv-
ing corporation is bound to the contracts of the disappearing corpora-
319 Id. at 423.
320 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 555; see also Reagan, supra note 300, at 915 ("The Court declined
to decide whether the successor was bound by the substantive provisions of the predecessor's
agreement. It decided only that the successor was obligated to arbitrate the successorship issue
as well as the substantive questions of contract interpretation.").
321 Interestingly, the Court provided no guidance as to what test the arbitrator should
apply in determining whether a successor employer was bound by a particular substantive
provision in the collective bargaining agreement between the predecessor and the union. It has
been recognized that "giving the arbitrator authority to determine which substantive provisions
of the contract will carry over takes him outside his accustomed role of interstitial interpreta-
tion and application of the 'common law of the shop."' Note, supra note 295, at 426. It has
also been recognized that the court would be required to fulfill this role if the collective bar-
gaining agreement did not contain an arbitration provision. Id. at 433.
322 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549.
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tion."323 As has been noted, the ultimate holding was "consistent with
heretofore unchallenged principles of corporation-contract law that al-
though a successor is not bound by the contracts of the predecessor em-
ployer following a purchase of the predecessor's business, the successor
is bound by such contracts after a merger in which the predecessor's
business is absorbed into that of the successor." 324
But the Court chose not to rely on this reasoning (simply noting that
"the principles of law governing ordinary contracts would not bind to a
contract an unconsenting successor"), 325 and instead relied on federal la-
bor policy. 3 2 6 Like the Court's decision in J.L Case in 1944 (where the
Court chose to hear the case to send a message that federal labor policy
would predominate when deciding which labor relations promises to en-
force and how to interpret them), the Court avoided an easy way out, and
instead reaffirmed that in the area of labor relations, contract law was
dead.
Thus, from the passage of the Wagner Act through the Warren
Court era, the Court, when deciding which labor relations promises to
enforce, and deciding how to interpret them, gave tremendous weight to
federal labor policies. In this respect, its approach to collective bargain-
ing agreements was consistent with the legal process approach to con-
tracts in general, in which competing principles and policies were
balanced. 327 Interestingly, though, federal labor policy was given so
much weight that other principles and polices were virtually banished
from the equation. Accordingly, if classical contract law had died during
this era, collective bargaining agreements had suffered the same fate.
B. The Tide Turns: The Court and Labor Relations Promises,
1970s to Present
In the 1970s, when the legal process consensus was shattering, and
Grant Gilmore was wondering if classical contract law would be resur-
rected, the Court shifted course and began emphasizing freedom of con-
tract notions in addressing promises in labor relations. And it began by
significantly undercutting, if not overruling sub silentio, the Wiley opin-
ion, when it revisited the successorship issue in 1972 in NLRB v. Burns
International Security Services, Inc.328
323 Note, supra note 295, at 420 n.7.
324 Reagan, supra note 300, at 915.
325 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 308.
326 Reagan, supra note 300, at 915 ("Although Wiley involved a merger situation, the
Supreme Court brushed aside this narrow ground of decision, stating that it was not bound by
state law, and held that it was to apply or fashion federal law in actions for breach of contract
brought under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.") (footnotes omitted).
327 See Kennedy, supra note 138.
328 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
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In Burns, the predecessor employer and the union entered into a
three-year collective bargaining agreement.329 The predecessor had a
contract to provide security services to Lockheed Aircraft Service Co.,
and when that contract expired shortly after entering into the collective
agreement, the successor employer won the contract with Lockheed.330
The successor retained twenty seven of the predecessor's employees, and
brought in fifteen of its own employees.33' The union demanded that the
successor recognize it as the employees' bargaining representative and
that the successor honor the collective bargaining agreement with the
predecessor. 332 The successor refused, and the union filed unfair labor
practice charges against the successor. 333 The NLRB found that the suc-
cessor violated §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Labor Act by failing to rec-
ognize the union and failing to honor the predecessor's collective
bargaining agreement.334
The union's decision to file an unfair labor practice charge as op-
posed to suing the successor under § 301 meant that the Court (after an
NLRB decision) would ultimately have to address whether it was unlaw-
ful for the successor to refuse to honor the collective bargaining agree-
ment, and it could not simply refer the issue to arbitration, as in Wiley.
And importantly, after the NLRB heard the case, it held that the entire
collective bargaining agreement had to be honored (not just the arbitra-
tion provision). 335
The Court quickly made it clear that the tide had turned in favor of
the autonomy principle. The opinion began with a strong statement in
favor of freedom of contract principles, indicating that "Congress has
consistently declined to interfere with free collective bargaining . . . ."336
The Court then quoted a prior decision in which the Court stated that one
of the Labor Act's fundamental policies is freedom of contract.337 The
Court also emphasized Congress' recognition in 1935 of the importance
of freedom of contract by quoting the following committee statement:
The committee wishes to dispel any possible false im-
pression that this bill is designed to compel the making
of agreements or to permit governmental supervision of
their terms. It must be stressed that the duty to bargain
collectively does not carry with it the duty to reach an
329 Id. at 275.
330 Id.
331 Id.
332 Id. at 275-76.
333 Id. at 276.
334 Id.
335 Id. at 276 n.2.
336 Id. at 282.
337 Id. at 284 (quoting H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970)).
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agreement, because the essence of collective bargaining
is that either party shall be free to decide whether pro-
posals made to it are satisfactory.338
But for the Court to rule in favor of the successor, it needed to
distinguish Wiley. The Court in Wiley had held that it was possible for
certain substantive terms to be binding on a successor. 339 The Court first
distinguished Wiley on the grounds that Wiley was a § 301 action
whereas this was an unfair labor practice (ULP) proceeding, and the
NLRB's powers in a ULP proceeding are expressly limited by § 8(d)
(which provides that the duty to bargain "does not compel either party to
agree to a provision or require the making of a concession"). 34 0 The
Court then asserted that the Wiley decision emphasized "[t]he preference
of national labor policy for arbitration as a substitute for tests of strength
before contending forces .... ."341 The Court referred to "Wiley's limited
accommodation between the legislative endorsement of freedom of con-
tract and the judicial preference for peaceful arbitral settlement of labor
disputes .... ."342
But the Court understated the significance of Wiley's holding. The
Court in Wiley held that the union's claims were not unreasonable, and
could possibly prevail at arbitration. 343 And if they could possibly pre-
vail at arbitration, the Court was announcing that the substantive terms of
the predecessor's collective agreement could potentially bind an un-con-
senting successor employer.3" Also, if there was no arbitration agree-
ment the court would have to resolve the issue of whether the successor
was bound by any substantive terms. Thus, as previously discussed, Wi-
ley could not have been simply about the preference for arbitration to
resolve disputes. It is true the enforceability of the arbitration provision
against the successor was influenced by the policy in favor of arbitration,
but there were other substantive provisions that an arbitrator could still
find binding. Thus, the Court's effort to distinguish Wiley based on the
arbitration provision was unconvincing, and simply masked the fact the
Court was breaking sharply with the Wiley decision's rejection of the
autonomy principle.
As previously noted, the Court, in an effort to distinguish Wiley,
also maintained that the NLRB's power to hold substantive provisions
enforceable was more constrained than the arbitrator.345 The Court be-
338 S. Rep. No. 573, at 12 (1935).
339 See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 555 (1964).
340 Bums, 406 U.S. at 285.
341 Id. at 286 (quoting Wiley, 376 U.S. at 551).
342 Id.
343 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 555.
344 See id.
345 Burns, 406 U.S. at 285.
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lieved that § 8(d) prohibited the imposition of substantive terms without
agreement, and relied on the Act's legislative history. 346 This is curious.
The Court could have taken issue with whether a successor's refusal to
honor the collective bargaining agreement, even if wrongful, would have
been a § 8(a)(1) and §8(a)(5) violation. The Court could easily have held
it was not, finding that Congress rejected the idea that a breach of a
collective bargaining agreement would itself be an unfair labor prac-
tice.3 4 7 But the Court's argument seemed to suggest that an arbitrator
has the power to impose contract terms upon the successor but the NLRB
does not. This seemed nothing more than an effort to distinguish Wiley
and avoid overruling it.
The Court also suggested that the factual background of Wiley that
might have permitted a finding by the arbitrator that substantive terms
were binding did not exist in the present case. 348 For example, the Court
stated that Wiley
dealt with a merger occurring against a background of
state law that embodied the general rule that in merger
situations the surviving corporation is liable for the obli-
gations of the disappearing corporation. Here, there was
no merger or sale of assets, and there were no dealings
whatsoever between Wackenhut and Burns. On the con-
trary, they were competitors for the same work, each
bidding for the service contract at Lockheed. Burns pur-
chased nothing from Wackenhut and became liable for
none of its financial obligations. 349
This effort to distinguish Wiley was similarly unconvincing because the
Court in Wiley rejected reliance on state law. 3 5 0 Accordingly, all of the
Court's efforts to distinguish Wiley reveal that the Court was in fact bas-
ing its decision on a principle that was incompatible with Wiley-the
autonomy principle.
The Court then returned to contract notions, stating that the facts
were insufficient "for implying either in fact or in law that Burns had
agreed or must be held to have agreed to honor Wackenhut's collective-
bargaining contract." 3 5' The Court then invoked the idea of freedom of
contract and its underlying autonomy principle:
346 See id. at 282.
347 See NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357, 361 n.5 (1969) ("Congress established the judicial
remedy of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act . . . in lieu of a proposal to make
breach of a collective bargaining agreement itself an unfair labor practice.").
348 Burns, 406 U.S. at 286.
349 Id. (citation omitted).
350 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 548 (1964).
351 Burns, 406 U.S. at 287.
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This bargaining freedom means . . . [the parties] are free
from having contract provisions imposed upon them
against their will. Here, Burns had notice of the exis-
tence of the Wackenhut collective-bargaining contract,
but it did not consent to be bound by it . . .. Nothing in
its actions . . . indicated that Burns was assuming the
obligations of the contract, and 'allowing the Board to
compel agreement when the parties themselves are una-
ble to agree would violate the fundamental premise on
which the Act is based-private bargaining under gov-
ernmental supervision of the procedure alone, without
any official compulsion over the actual terms of the
contract.' 352
The Court then sowed the seeds of confusion by stating, in dicta,
what appeared to be an argument in favor of never having the substantive
terms be binding on a successor (despite its failure to expressly overrule
Wiley) based on the policy of promoting exchange:
[H]olding either the union or the new employer bound to
the substantive terms of an old collective-bargaining
contract may result in serious inequities. A potential
employer may be willing to take over a moribund busi-
ness only if he can make changes in corporate structure,
composition of the labor force, work location, task as-
signment, and nature of supervision. Saddling such an
employer with the terms and conditions of employment
contained in the old collective-bargaining contract may
make these changes impossible and may discourage and
inhibit the transfer of capital. On the other hand, a union
may have made concessions to a small or failing em-
ployer that it would have unwilling to make to a large or
economically successful firm. The congressional policy
manifest in the Act is to enable the parties to negotiate
for any protection either deems appropriate, but to allow
the balance of bargaining advantage to be set by eco-
nomic power realities.353
The Court also noted that if the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement were binding on a successor, the discharge and grievance pro-
cedures would be as well, and thus any limitations on termination of
employment would be applied to the successor's decision whether to hire
352 Id. (quoting H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970)).
353 Id. at 287-88.
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any of the predecessor's employees. 354 The Court further noted that "the
pre-existing contract's provisions with respect to wages, seniority rights,
vacation privileges, pension and retirement fund benefits, job security
provisions, work assignments and the like would devolve on the succes-
sor." 3 5 5 The Court also noted that the union would have no duty to bar-
gain with the successor for a modification of the contract during its term;
the employer might inherit contract duties accrued under prior contracts
between the union and the predecessor; and under the NLRB's contract-
bar rule could not challenge the union's majority support during the con-
tract's term. 356
Thus, just eight years after the high-water mark of the "collective
bargaining agreements are dead" era was reached in 1964 in Wiley, the
Court all but overruled Wiley. This sent a strong message that the auton-
omy principle would be given much more weight than during the legal
process era.
The Supreme Court soon extended the emphasis on autonomy to
labor law promises that were not included in collective bargaining agree-
ments. In 1983 the Supreme Court in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale 3 57 addressed
whether the Wagner Act preempts a state-law claim by replacement
workers who were promised permanent employment but then terminated
at the strike's conclusion to make room for returning strikers. In the
case, the union called a strike after the employer and the union reached
impasse on a new collective agreement.358 The employer advertised for
employees to "permanently replace striking warehouse and maintenance
employees." 359 When the employer hired the replacement workers, each
replacement worker signed a statement indicating that he or she was
hired "as a regular full time permanent replacement to permanently re-
place" a designated employee. 360 The employer also reassured the re-
placement workers in a letter:
We recognize that many of you continue to be concerned
about your status as an employee. The Company's posi-
tion on this matter has not changed nor do we expect it
to change. You will continue to be permanent replace-
ment employees so long as you conduct yourselves in
accordance with the policies and practices that are in ef-
fect here at Belknap . . . . [W]e have made it clear to the
354 Id. at 288.
355 Id. at 288-89.
356 Id. at 289-90.
357 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
358 Id. at 494.
359 Id.
360 Id. at 494-95.
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Union that we have no intention of getting rid of the per-
manent replacement employees just in order to provide
jobs for the replaced strikers if and when the Union calls
off the strike.361
Thereafter, the employer and the union entered into a strike settle-
ment agreement that resolved not only the strike, but an unfair labor
practice charge as well. 3 6 2 Under the agreement, the employer promised
to reinstate the striking employees. 363 When the employer laid off the
replacement workers to make room for the returning strikers, the replace-
ment workers sued the employer in state court for misrepresentation and
breach of contract.36 The replacement workers alleged that the em-
ployer knew its promise to them that they would not be displaced was
false, and that in any event, the promise was breached.365 The replace-
ment workers sought damages. 366
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Labor Act
preempted the replacement workers' claims, 36 7 and the Court held that it
did not.368 The Court characterized a system in which an employer was
free to breach its promise to the replacement workers with impunity as a
"lawless regime" 369 and emphasized the "solemn promises of permanent
employment" the employer gave the replacement workers. 370 The Court,
in discussing the effects of rendering the employer's promise unenforce-
able, relied in part on potential replacement workers likely being discour-
aged from accepting employment based on the knowledge that the
employer's promise is unenforceable. 37' Thus, the Court based its deci-
sion on the moral obligation to keep a promise and the policy of promot-
ing exchanges.
The Court also revisited the J.I. Case issue in 1987 in Caterpillar
Inc. v. Williams.372 In Caterpillar, the plaintiffs worked for the defen-
dant at its San Leandro, California, facility.373 The plaintiffs initially
361 Id.
362 Id. at 496.
363 Id.
364 Id.
365 Id. at 496-97.
366 Id. at 497.
367 Id.
368 Id. at 500. The Supreme Court noted in dicta that an order of reinstatement would be
preempted if it required the firing of a striker entitled to reinstatement. Id. at 511 n.13. The
court noted that "[tlo do so would be to deprive returning strikers of jobs committed to them
by the national labor laws." Id.
369 Id. at 500.
370 See id. at 506.
37' See id. at 502.
372 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
373 Id. at 388.
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held positions covered by a collective bargaining agreement, but were
then promoted or moved to a position outside the agreement's cover-
age.3 7 4 The plaintiffs alleged that while they were in positions outside
the agreement's coverage, they were promised job security and that if the
San Leandro facility ever closed, they would be given other employment
within the company. 375 The plaintiffs further alleged that in reliance on
these promises they remained employed with the company instead of
seeking employment elsewhere. 3 7 6 Thereafter, the plaintiffs were down-
graded to positions covered by the collective bargaining agreement, but
their supervisors orally assured them that the downgrade was tempo-
rary.377 The employer then notified the plaintiffs that the San Leandro
facility was closing and that they would be laid off.37 8
The plaintiffs sued the employer in state court alleging the employer
breached its individual employment contracts with them by laying them
off.3 7 9 The employer removed the action to federal court, arguing that
any individual employment contracts "were, as a matter of federal sub-
stantive labor law, merged into and superseded by the . . . collective
bargaining agreements." 380
The Court held that the suit was not removable to federal court be-
cause the plaintiffs' claims were not based on the breach of a collective
bargaining agreement, but were based on the breach of individual em-
ployment contracts.38' The employer argued, however, that when the
plaintiffs returned to the bargaining unit their individual contracts were
subsumed into, and eliminated by, the collective agreement under the
holding in JI. Case.3 82 The Court, however, rejected the argument, not-
ing that J.I. Case had held that not every individual employment contract
was automatically superseded by a collective agreement, and the em-
ployer could raise this issue in the state court proceeding.383 Thus, un-
like J.. Case, the Court now emphasized the autonomy principle, and
deemphasized federal labor policy.
374 Id.
375 Id. at 388-89.
376 Id. at 389.
377 Id.
378 Id.
379 Id. at 390.
380 Id. (alteration in original).
381 See id. at 394.
382 Id. at 395-96.
383 Id. at 396-98.
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Recently, as the importance of labor unions has declined,384 and the
importance of "minimum-terms legislation" has increased,38 5 the Court's
most important rulings regarding labor relations promises have involved
their interplay with federal anti-discrimination statutes. These cases are
interesting in that they inject a policy consideration external to the fed-
eral labor laws: the federal policy prohibiting employment discrimination
based on certain characteristics, such as race, sex, age, and disability
(among others). 386
For example, in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,38 7 the Court addressed
whether a collective bargaining agreement's arbitration provision re-
quired employees to submit their age discrimination claims under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) to arbitra-
tion.388 The Court, which concluded that they did, framed the issue as
whether the ADEA (not the NLRA) removed such claims from being
subject to a collective bargaining agreement's arbitration provision.389
The Court framed the issue that way for the following reason:
As in any contractual negotiation, a union may agree to
the inclusion of an arbitration provision in a collective-
bargaining agreement in return for other concessions
from the employer. Courts generally may not interfere
in this bargained-for exchange. 'Judicial nullification of
contractual concessions . .. is contrary to what the Court
has recognized as one of the fundamental policies of the
National Labor Relations Act-freedom of contract.' 390
384 See Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical
Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 351, 360 (2002) (noting that the importance
of unions has declined over the prior fifty years).
385 See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance
in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. Riev. 342, 368 (2004) ("[F]rom the 1960s to the
1980s, as unionism declined, individual employment law expanded and specific, substantive
federal regulations on workplace issues increased from about forty-four to over two
hundred.").
386 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 7 (2008) (prohibit-
ing discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2008) (prohibiting discrimination based
on age); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2008) (prohib-
iting discrimination based on disability). See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36, 45 (1974) (referring to the "important congressional policy against discriminatory employ-
ment practices.").
387 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
388 Id.
389 Id. at 1465.
390 Id. at 1464 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 328 (1974)) (internal quotation marks
and brackets omitted).
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After concluding that the ADEA did not preclude the arbitration of
such claims, the Court stated that "there is no legal basis for the Court to
strike down the arbitration clause in this CBA, which was freely negoti-
ated by the Union and the [employer], and which clearly and unmistaka-
bly requires respondents to arbitrate the age-discrimination
claims . . . ."391 And even if there might be concerns about whether such
claims were suitable for an arbitration conducted by the union, the Court
stated that "it is not for us to substitute our view of . . . policy for the
legislation which has been passed by Congress." 392 Thus, continuing
with a trend started in the 1970s, the Court's decision emphasized no-
tions of freedom of contract and downplayed judicial policymaking.
C. Conclusion with Respect to the Supreme Court and Labor
Relations Promises
As has been shown, from the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935
through the end of the Warren Court era in 1969, the Court, when decid-
ing which labor relations promises to enforce and how to interpret them,
rejected classical contract law and its emphasis on freedom of con-
tract. 393 Rather, consistent with the legal process school that prevailed
during this time period, the Court weighed competing principles and pol-
icies in deciding which labor relations promises to enforce and how to
interpret them. 3 9 4 Importantly, the Court gave the federal labor policy of
reducing industrial strife tremendous weight, virtually to the exclusion of
all other principles and policies. 3 9 5 The Court's approach was consistent
with the idea that contract law during this period was "dead." 3 9 6
But starting in the 1970s, the tide turned and the Court, in deciding
cases involving labor relations promises, has emphasized the principle of
autonomy, the principle that a promise should be kept for moral reasons,
and the policy of promoting exchange by enforcing the parties' agree-
ment.3 9 7 Thus, at least for labor relations promises, Gilmore's question
in 1974 about whether classical contract law would be resurrected was
answered in the affirmative. But which approach is correct?
391 129 S. Ct. at 1466.
392 Id. at 1472 (alteration in original) (quoting Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafete-
rias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 52 (2008)).
393 See supra Part III.A.
394 Id.
395 Id.
396 See supra Part LB.
397 See supra Part Ill.B.
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IV. THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF FEDERAL LABOR POLICY WHEN THE
SUPREME COURT ENFORCES AND INTERPRETS
LABOR RELATIONS PROMISES
The Supreme Court, when deciding an unfair labor practice case
under the Wagner Act, or a case involving an alleged breach of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement under the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, must ap-
ply the substantive law set forth in those statutes. Thus, determining
which approach is correct (either an approach emphasizing the federal
labor policy of reducing industrial strife or an approach emphasizing the
autonomy principle) requires an analysis of legislative intent. As dis-
cussed below, such an analysis discloses that Congress likely intended
the Supreme Court to give little weight to federal labor policy when de-
ciding which labor relations promises to enforce and how to interpret
them.
Under the Wagner Act, prior to its amendment by the Taft-Hartley
Act in 1947, Congress surely intended the Court to have a limited role in
enforcing and interpreting labor relations promises, and also intended the
Court's role in formulating federal labor policy to be limited. The Wag-
ner Act created a series of "unfair labor practices," but it did not create a
private cause of action over which federal courts would have original
jurisdiction. Rather, original jurisdiction was vested in the NLRB. 39 8
Also, even though the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals ex-
ercise appellate jurisdiction over unfair labor practice cases, Congress
intended the NLRB to play the primary role in implementing and devel-
oping federal labor policy.39 9 In fact, Congress intended the NLRB to
act as a "supreme court" of labor relations.400 This is not surprising,
because the historical context surrounding the Wagner Act's passage was
one in which courts, including federal courts, had done a poor job in the
area of labor relations, having consistently adopted anti-union rules of
law. 4 0 1 Accordingly, the evidence is strong that Congress, when it en-
acted the Wagner Act in 1935, did not intend the Supreme Court to play
a significant role in implementing federal labor policy. Of course, be-
cause Congress gave the Court appellate jurisdiction over unfair labor
practice cases decided by the NLRB, the Court was required to at least
ensure that the NLRB's policy choices were reasonable. 402
398 See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2006) (providing the NLRB with original jurisdiction over unfair
labor practice cases).
399 Daniel P. O'Gorman, Construing the National Labor Relations Act: The NLRB and
Methods of Statutory Construction, 81 TFMP. L. REV. 177, 185 (2008).
400 J. JOSEPH HU-THMACHER, SENATOR ROBEr F. WAGNER ANDT IHE RIsE OF URBAN Lmii-
ERALISM 191 (1968).
401 GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 196, at 2-4.
402 O'Gorman, supra note 399, at 190.
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The evidence is also strong that Congress did not intend the Su-
preme Court to give substantial weight to federal labor policy when exer-
cising appellate jurisdiction in a case under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act. As has previously been discussed, on its face § 301 was simply
procedural, doing nothing more than providing federal courts with origi-
nal jurisdiction over suits alleging the breach of a collective bargaining
agreement. 403 Also, the Taft-Hartley Act's legislative history reveals
that the provision's purpose was to simply ensure that unions would be
bound by their collective agreements with employers. The Senate Report
provided:
If unions can break agreements with relative impunity,
then such agreements do not tend to stabilize industrial
relations. The execution of an agreement does not by
itself promote industrial peace. The chief advantage
which an employer can reasonably expect from a collec-
tive labor agreement is assurance of uninterrupted opera-
tion during the term of the agreement. Without some
effective method of assuring freedom from economic
warfare for the term of the agreement, there is little rea-
son why an employer would desire to sign such a
contract.
Consequently, to encourage the making of agreements
and to promote industrial peace through faithful per-
formance by the parties, collective agreements
should be enforceable in the Federal courts. 4 04
Thus, § 301's purpose was to promote the policy of industrial
peace, but this was to be accomplished by enforcing collective bargain-
ing agreements against unions when they breached them.4 0 5 There is no
evidence that Congress intended the Supreme Court, when it was exer-
cising appellate jurisdiction over a § 301 case, to inject federal labor pol-
icy into the decision of whether to enforce a labor relations promise and
the decision of how it should be interpreted.
Other portions of the legislative history support this conclusion.
The legislative history suggests § 301 was no more than a procedural
statute, providing that "[o]nce parties have made a collective bargaining
contract the enforcement of that contract should be left to the usual
processes of the law . . ."406 And it is generally agreed that the govern-
403 See supra Part II.B.
404 S. Rep. No. 105, at 16 (1947).
405 See id.
406 H.R. Rep. No. 510, at 41-42 (1947) (Conf. Rep.).
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ment was not to dictate the agreement's substance. 407 Thus, Congress
likely intended § 301 to do no more than ensure that collective bargain-
ing agreements were as enforceable as other contracts.
Interestingly, the late Harry H. Wellington, a noted legal process
scholar, consistent with a legal process approach, did not fault the Court
for considering industrial peace as a relevant consideration in competi-
tion with freedom of contract, but simply faulted the Court for not get-
ting the balance correct.408 He believed that the Court overstated the
threat to industrial peace from strikes over collective bargaining disputes,
relying on Professor Stewart Macaulay's famous argument that contract
law is not particularly important to contract disputes409 and on the fact
that strikes over contract disputes are not that common. 4 10 Professor
Clyde Summers likewise defended the Court's use of federal labor pol-
icy, even if the Court's performance could be faulted:
Courts are not ideal institutions for performing this func-
tion, and schoolboy learning teaches that policy choices
are for the legislature. Certainly this counsels the courts
to tread softly in the area, but for them to refuse to per-
form this function altogether would be to reject an his-
torically established responsibility. Indeed the history of
Section 301 of Taft-Hartley suggests that the courts may
do a more responsible and workable job of developing
the law of collective bargaining agreements than Con-
gress. That section, as written by Congress, left every
significant question unanswered-what substantive law
was to be applied, what remedies were to be available,
whether state courts should be given jurisdiction, what
role should be given to arbitration, and what role should
be given the NLRB. The Court's performance in giving
this vacuous section sense and content may be faulted,
but it hardly demonstrates that the courts are less compe-
tent than Congress to perform this function, or that
courts should stay their hand until Congress has given
guidance.4 11
407 See Cox, supra note 222, at 3 ("The terms of the bargain are not determined by the
government . . . ."); Summers, supra note 185, at 531 ("Although the law requires bargaining
and channels the bargaining process, it does not compel agreement nor dictate the terms of
settlement. The substantive terms are those negotiated and agreed to by the parties in a bar-
gained exchange.") (footnotes omitted).
408 See Wellington, supra note 194, at 490.
409 See id. at 490 n. I11 (citing Macaulay, supra note 168).
410 See id. at 490-91.
411 Summers, supra note 185, at 560-61 n.126.
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Conversely, one student author has argued that in the context of the
successorship cases previously discussed, federal courts do not have au-
thority under § 301 to implement federal labor policy:
[S]ection 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
would not seem to accord the federal courts power to
impose a duty to arbitrate on the basis of the relative
interests of employers and unions. The judicial role
under section 301 should be confined to enforcing pri-
vate arrangements reached by the parties through the
statutorily structured process of collective bargaining;
judicial imposition of a duty to arbitrate in pursuit of a
public policy of avoiding strikes would be a departure
from the institutional role accorded the federal courts in
the complex of arrangements for private and public or-
dering established by Congress. Thus, for example, it is
clear that if the original collective bargaining agreement
with Interscience had not had an arbitration provision,
the Court could not, under section 301, have imposed a
duty to arbitrate in Wiley, even though the likelihood of
labor strife and the relative interests of the employees
and employer might have argued strongly for arbitra-
tion . . . . [A] judicial decision to impose a duty to arbi-
trate without the consent of all affected parties would
appear to require clear legislative sanction. 4 12
This same student author argued that "attempts by courts so to im-
pose on the parties their views on what is appropriate in industrial rela-
tions are among the very evils which the national labor policy has sought
to eliminate." 413
Wellington's and Summers's arguments are unpersuasive. If the
Court has done a poor job of implementing federal labor policy, this
confirms Congress's original belief that the courts are not well equipped
for making labor relations policy. Thus, there exists a practical reason
why courts should avoid implementing federal labor policy when inter-
preting labor relations promises. With respect to Summers's argument
that there is reason to believe the Court has done a better job than Con-
gress at developing federal labor policy, this depends on one's view of
good labor policy. What if the Court had implemented federal labor pol-
icy in a "bad" way? Would the Court then lose the power to consider
federal labor policy? Whether Congress gave the Court the power to
412 Note, supra note 295, at 423-24 (footnote omitted).
413 Id. at 426.
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consider federal labor policy should determine whether the Court has
such a role, not whether one agrees with the Court's policy choices.
With respect to Summers's arguments that the Court avoiding fed-
eral labor policy would involve "reject[ing] [its] historically established
responsibility," his only support that it is the Court's responsibility is to
point to Congress's failure to provide clearer guidance regarding how to
decide such cases. 4 14 Such an argument fails for two reasons. First, as
previously discussed, the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act
reveals that Congress's intent was to make collective bargaining agree-
ments as enforceable as other contracts. 4 15 Its purpose in doing so was to
ensure that unions would be held responsible for breaches of their agree-
ments. Thus, there exists evidence that Congress intended the Court to
treat such contracts like other contracts, which would ordinarily not in-
clude injecting policy issues into the enforceability and interpretation
questions. Second, it is more likely that the absence of express directives
from Congress means Congress intended the Court to interpret labor rela-
tions promises like any other promises. If Congress intended to vest the
Court with a policymaking role when interpreting labor relations
promises, there would likely be evidence of such an intention.
But an important question remains unanswered. If Congress simply
granted the Court the authority and responsibility to treat collective bar-
gaining agreements like other contracts, what principles and policies did
Congress believe should be considered in traditional contract cases? The
Taft-Hartley Act was enacted in 1947, at the dawn of the legal process
era, and as classical contract law was dying.416 The Act was, therefore,
enacted during the time of transition from classical contract law to the
legal process approach.4 17
The drafters of the Taft-Hartley Act surely understood that contract
law was primarily based on the common law, and thus contract doctrine
was subject to change. Accordingly, it is likely that Congress did not
intend the Court to forever interpret collective bargaining agreements ac-
cording to, for example, the rules set forth in the Restatement (First) of
Contracts. But, as we know, Congress intended them to be treated like
other contracts.4t 8 Thus, although Congress likely intended the Court to
use doctrines that were only just developing (such as expanded use of
impracticability, good faith, and unconscionability), it also likely in-
tended such doctrines to receive no special treatment because of "federal
labor policies."
414 See Summers, supra note 185, at 560 n.126.
415 See supra Part II.B.
416 See id.
417 See supra Part I.B.
418 See supra Part II.B & notes 406-07 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that from the Wagner Act's passage in 1935
until the end of the Warren Court era in 1969, the Supreme Court in-
jected a heavy dose of federal labor policy into the enforcement and in-
terpretation of labor relations promises. This approach was consistent
with Grant Gilmore's famous argument that contract law was dead. But
at the time Gilmore was speculating as to whether contract law would
rise again, the Supreme Court eschewed policy considerations and began
enforcing and interpreting labor relations promises based on the will of
the parties. This approach is preferable, because it is consistent with
congressional intent.

